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1. Introduction 
In recent years, strategic alliances between airlines have become increasingly 
popular.  The format of a strategic alliance between airlines can vary from a limited 
marketing arrangement, for example an arrangement between partner carriers that only 
makes their frequent-flyer programs reciprocal, 1 to more extensive arrangements that 
include reciprocal frequent-flyer programs as well as codesharing.  Reciprocal frequent-
flyer programs effectively allow passengers that hold frequent-flyer membership with one 
carrier in the alliance to earn and redeem frequent-flyer points across any partner carrier in 
the alliance.  A codeshare arrangement effectively allows each carrier in the alliance to sell 
tickets for seats on its partners’ airplane, i.e., partners essentially share certain facilities, in 
this case airplanes, that are solely owned by one of the partners. 
Researchers have written extensively on the impact that strategic alliances have on 
airfare [Brueckner and Whalen (2000); Brueckner (2001 and 2003); Bamberger, Carlton 
and Neumann (2004); Ito and Lee (2007); Gayle (2008 and 2013); Gayle and Brown (2014) 
among others]. 2  However, there is a paucity of work that examines the impact that 
strategic alliances may have on deterring potential competitors from entering a relevant 
market.  This is a particularly interesting aspect of strategic alliances to study since a 
substantial amount of these alliances are formed between traditional major/legacy carriers, 
who may face increasingly stiff competition from the growing prominence of low-cost-
carriers (LCCs).  Some researchers argue that hub-and-spoke network carriers form and 
use strategic codeshare alliances to better compete with low-cost-carriers, [Mantovani and 
Tarola (2007)].  So the following series of relevant questions need careful study.  First, 
does the evidence support the argument that strategic alliances between major airlines, 
among achieving other goals, serve to deter entry of potential entrants to a relevant market?  
Second, if an entry-deterrence effect is evident, is there a particular type of practice among 
                                                             
1 Membership in an airline’s frequent-flyer program allows the passenger to accumulate points each time the 
passenger flies on the airline.  The frequent-flyer program allows the passenger to be eligible for various 
rewards once the passenger accumulates points beyond certain pre-determine thresholds.  As such, frequent-
flyer programs are designed to build customer loyalty to the carrier that offers the program. 
 
2 Earlier contributions to this literature include: Oum and Park (1997); Park (1997); Park and Zhang (1998); 
and Park and Zhang (2000). 
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alliance partners that is most effective at deterring entry?  Third, does the market entry-
deterrent impact of strategic alliances vary by the identity of potential market entrants? 3  
Chen and Ross (2000) theoretically explore the anticompetitive effect of a 
particular type of strategic alliance, by which the partner airlines share important facilities 
such as airplanes, terminals etc.  They argue that this type of alliance can forestall a 
complete and competitive entry by another firm, that is, such alliances can have an entry-
deterrent effect.  The mechanism through which Chen and Ross envisioned that a strategic 
alliance may deter a complete and competitive entry is as follows.  An incumbent offers to 
form a strategic alliance with a potential entrant, which takes the form of the incumbent 
willing to share its facility with the potential entrant in order to discourage the potential 
entrant from building its own facility and entering on a larger, more competitive scale.  In 
the context of a codeshare alliance, this would translate into the incumbent offering to let 
a potential entrant sell tickets for seats on the incumbent’s plane in order to discourage the 
potential entrant from putting its own plane on the route.  So based on Chen and Ross’s 
argument, entry-deterrent codesharing should primarily take place between a market 
incumbent and the potential entrant the incumbent is intending to deter. 
Lin (2005) uses a theoretical model to show that incumbents can use codeshare 
alliances as a credible threat to deter the entry of potential entrants who do not have 
significant cost advantage.  The author uses the model to show that, owing to joint profit 
maximizing behavior between allied airlines, there exists an equilibrium in which the joint 
profit of two allied airlines is higher than the sum of their individual profits if they were 
not allied.  In addition, this higher joint profit of the allied airlines comes at the expense of 
lower profit for a new non-allied entrant.  This equilibrium implies that if market entry cost 
is sufficiently high, such that entry in the presence of an alliance between market 
incumbents is unprofitable for the new non-allied entrant, but profitable if incumbents were 
not allied, then formation of the alliance can be done to strategically deter entry. 4 
                                                             
3 In a separate, but related airline entry-deterrence literature, Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1995); Hendricks, 
Piccione and Tan (1997); Berechman, Poddar and Shy (1998); Aguirregabiria and Ho (2010) among others 
have argued that hub-and-spoke route networks adopted by many legacy carriers do give these carriers an 
incentive and the ability to deter entry of other carriers that do not use hub-and-spoke route network, which 
include many low-cost-carriers.  But this literature focuses on the entry deterrence effect of hub-and-spoke 
networks rather than more specifically on the entry deterrence effect of codeshare alliances. 
4 Lin (2008) extends this model to consider situations in which an incumbent has a relatively large hub-and-
spoke network and entry has positive spillover network effects for the incumbent.   
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Via reduced-form econometric regressions, Goetz and Shapiro (2012) empirically 
test for the presence of entry-deterrence motives behind codesharing alliances, and find 
that an incumbent is approximately 25% more likely than average to codeshare when facing 
the threat of entry by low-cost carriers.  However, Goetz and Shapiro (2012) did not 
investigate whether the entry-deterrence effect they found depends on the type of 
codesharing (Traditional versus Virtual) 5  employed by incumbent partner airlines.  In 
addition, they did not fully investigate whether the entry-deterrence effect of codesharing 
depends on the identity of the carrier that is threatening to enter the relevant market.  
Previous studies have argued that Southwest Airlines, if not the most formidable 
LCC in U.S. domestic air travel markets, is certainly among the most formidable LCCs in 
these markets.  As such, many studies have treated Southwest separately than other LCCs, 
or focused on Southwest as the sole LCC [for example see Morrison (2001), Goolsbee and 
Syverson (2008), Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012) among others]. Brueckner, Lee and 
Singer (2012) find that the presence of potential competition from Southwest reduces fares 
by 8 percent, while potential competition from other LCCs has no fare effect.  Mason and 
Morrison (2008) find significant differences between low-cost carriers in their business 
models.  Therefore, we are encouraged to investigate whether any possible entry-deterrent 
effect of codesharing depends on whether the potential entrant is Southwest versus other 
low-cost carriers. 
While Goetz and Shapiro (2012) use a reduced-form regression analysis to 
empirically test whether domestic codesharing alliances are motivated by an entry-
deterrence purpose, to the best of our knowledge, there is no other empirical analysis of 
this issue.  We believe a structural econometric analysis of this issue is needed to take us a 
step further in examining the evidence on this type of strategic behavior by airlines. 
Advantages of using a structural econometric model are that: (1) we are able to quantify, 
in monetary terms, possible market entry barriers associated with codesharing; and (2) we 
are able to predict the extent to which a potential entrant’s market entry probabilities are 
affected by market incumbent carrier’s codesharing.   
                                                             
 
5  In the Definition and Data section of the paper we define and distinguish Traditional and Virtual 
codesharing. 
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Therefore, the main objective of our paper is to use a structural econometric model 
to investigate: (1) whether codesharing between airlines in domestic air travel markets, a 
form of strategic alliance, has a deterrent effect on the entry of potential competitors; (2) 
whether there is a particular type of codesharing among alliance partners that is most 
effective at deterring entry; and (3) whether the market entry deterrence impact of 
codesharing varies by the identity of potential market entrants.  
To assess the deterrent effect of codesharing on market entry of potential 
competitors, we proceed as follows.  First, we estimate a discrete choice model of air travel 
demand.  Second, for the short-run supply side, we assume that multiproduct airlines set 
prices for their differentiated products according to a Nash equilibrium price-setting game.  
The Nash equilibrium price-setting assumption allows us to derive product-specific 
markups and use them to compute firm-level variable profits, which are subsequently used 
in a dynamic market entry/exit game.  Third, we specify a dynamic market entry/exit game 
played between airlines in which each airline chooses markets in which to be active during 
specific time periods in order to maximize its expected discounted stream of profit.  Per-
period profit comprises variable profit less per-period fixed cost and a one-time entry cost 
if the airline will serve the relevant market in the next period but not currently serving the 
market.  The dynamic entry/exit game allows us to estimate fixed and entry costs by 
exploiting previously computed variable profits from the Nash equilibrium price-setting 
game along with observed data on airlines’ decisions to enter and exit certain markets.  It 
is the estimated effect that codesharing between incumbents have on the entry cost of 
potential entrants that allows us to evaluate whether codesharing has an entry deterrent 
effect.6  
We specify entry cost functions such that we can identify whether or not the extent 
of codesharing by incumbent airlines in a market influences the market entry cost of 
potential entrants, and whether this influence differs by type of potential entrant.  A 
potential entrant can fall into one of three categories: (1) legacy carriers; (2) Southwest 
Airlines; or (3) other LCCs.  Since the majority of codesharing in U.S. domestic air travel 
markets occurs between legacy carriers, this implies that our entry cost function 
                                                             
6 For examples of dynamic structural entry deterrence models see Sweeting (2013), Williams 
(2012), Chicu (2012), and Snider (2009). 
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specification effectively allows us to explore whether codesharing between legacy carriers 
deferentially influences the market entry of: (1) other legacy carriers; (2) Southwest 
Airlines; (3) other LCCs; or some subset of the three carrier types. 
An important aspect of our analysis is that we follow Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle 
(2008) and decompose codesharing into two main types: (1) Traditional Codesharing; and 
(2) Virtual Codesharing.  As such, we are able to investigate whether possible entry 
deterrent effects of codesharing depend on the type of codesharing. 
Our econometric estimates from the entry cost function suggest that more 
codesharing, both traditional and virtual, between incumbent carriers in a market puts 
Southwest at a relative disadvantage to enter the market compared to all other potential 
entrants (legacy carriers and other low-cost carriers).  Specifically, each percentage point 
increase in traditional codeshare products offered by incumbents in a market raises market 
entry cost for Southwest by 0.3%, but reduces market entry cost by 0.64% and 0.39% for 
legacy and “other” low-cost carriers respectively.  However, each percentage point increase 
in virtual codeshare products offered by incumbents in a market raises market entry cost 
for Southwest by 0.08%, but reduces market entry cost by 0.14% and 0.36% for legacy and 
“other” low-cost carriers respectively.  In addition, the model predicts that Southwest’s 
market entry probabilities increase by a mean 15.81% when the parameters that capture the 
entry deterrence impact of codesharing are counterfactually set to zero in the model.  
Therefore, codesharing by market incumbent carriers has a relative market entry deterrent 
effect on Southwest.  Furthermore, the parameter estimates provide evidence that 
traditional codesharing has a larger impact on Southwest’s market entry cost compared to 
virtual codesharing. 
We argue that the entry deterrent effect is binding for Southwest but not for others 
due to the evidence that the vast majority of codesharing is done between legacy carriers, 
and competition between Southwest and legacy carriers is stronger than competition 
between other low-cost carriers and legacy carriers.  For example, as pointed out above, 
Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012) provide evidence that incumbent legacy carriers do not 
cut fares in response to potential competition from other low-cost carriers, but cut fares by 
8% in response to potential competition from Southwest. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Next we define and discuss 
6 
relevant concepts and terms used throughout this paper, and describe how we construct the 
dataset of our working sample.  Our econometric model is presented in section 3. Section 
4 discusses the estimation procedure and summarizes estimation results.  Concluding 
remarks are offered in section 5.  
 
2. Definitions and Data 
 2.1 Definitions 
A market is defined as a directional pair of origin and destination cities during a 
particular time period. For example, air travel from New York to Dallas is a different 
market than air travel from Dallas to New York.  Treating markets in a direction-specific 
manner better enables our model to account for the impact that heterogeneity in 
demographic, social and economic characteristics across origin cities have on air travel 
demand.  
An itinerary is a detailed plan of a journey from an origin to destination city, so it 
consists of one or more flight coupons depending on whether or not intermediate stops are 
required.  Each coupon typically represents travel on a particular flight.  Each flight has a 
ticketing carrier and an operating carrier.  The ticketing carrier, or sometimes referred to 
as the marketing carrier, is the airline selling the ticket for the seat, while the operating 
carrier is the airline whose plane actually transports the passenger.  A product is defined as 
the combination of ticketing carrier, operating carrier(s) and itinerary.  
A pure online product has an itinerary whose operating carrier for each flight 
coupon and ticketing carrier are the same.  For example, a two-segment ticket with both 
segments operated and marketed by United Airlines (UA), i.e. (UA/UA → UA/UA)7.  A 
flight is said to be codeshared when the operating and ticketing carriers for that flight differ.  
A traditional codeshared product is defined as an itinerary that has a single ticketing carrier 
for the trip, but multiple operating carriers, one of which is the ticketing carrier.  For 
example, a connecting itinerary between Continental Airlines (CO) and Delta Airlines 
(DL), marketed solely by Delta (CO/DL → DL/DL) is a traditional codeshared product.  A 
                                                             
7 The arrow notation divides carrier(s) information from one flight segment to the next. The two-letter code 
in front of the symbol “/” identify the operating carrier for that segment, while the two-letter code that 
immediately follows the symbol “/” identify the ticketing carrier.  
7 
virtual codeshared product is defined as an itinerary that has the same operating carrier for 
all trip segments, but this operating carrier differs from the ticketing carrier.  For example, 
a connecting itinerary operated entirely by United Airlines but marketed solely by US 
Airways (US) (UA/US→ UA/US), is a virtual codeshared product.8 
 
2.2 Data 
We use data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by 
the Office of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  The DB1B 
survey is a 10% random sample of airline tickets from certified carriers in the United States.  
A record in this survey represents a ticket.  Each ticket contains information on ticketing 
and operating carriers, origin and destination airports, fare, number of passengers, 
intermediate airport stops, market miles flown on the trip itinerary, nonstop miles between 
the origin and destination airports, and number of market coupons.  Unfortunately, there is 
no passenger-specific information in the data, nor is there any information on ticket 
restrictions such as advance-purchase and length-of-stay requirements. 
The data are quarterly, and our study uses data for the entire years of 2005, 2006 
and 2007.  Following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others, we select data on air 
travel between the 65 largest US cities. Some of the cities belong to the same metropolitan 
area and have multiple airports.  Table 1 reports a list of the cities and the relevant airport 
groupings we use based on common metropolitan areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8 Additional discussion and examples of pure online, traditional codeshare and virtual codeshare air travel 
products can be found in Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle (2007, 2008 and 2013).  In addition, see Gayle and 
Brown (2014).   
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Table 1 
Cites, airports and population 
City, State Airports 
City pop. 
2005 2006 2007 
New York-Newark-Jersey LGA, JFK, EWR 8,726,847  8,764,876  8,826,288  
Los Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,794,640  3,777,502  3,778,658  
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,824,584  2,806,391  2,811,035  
Dallas, TXa DAL, DFW 2,479,896  2,528,227  2,577,723  
Phoenix-Tempe-Mesa, AZ PHX 2,087,948  2,136,518  2,171,495  
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,076,189  2,169,248  2,206,573  
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,517,628  1,520,251  1,530,031  
San Diego, CA SAN 1,284,347  1,294,071  1,297,624  
San Antonio, TX SAT 1,258,733  1,292,082  1,323,698  
San Jose, CA SJC 908,870  918,619  931,344  
Detroit, MI DTW 921,149  918,849  917,234  
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 856,834  869,920  887,796  
Indianapolis, IN IND 789,250  792,619  796,611  
Jacksonville, FL JAX 786,938  798,494  805,325  
San Francisco, CA SFO 777,660  786,149  799,185  
Columbus, OH CMH 738,782  744,473  750,700  
Austin, TX AUS 708,293  730,729  749,120  
Memphis, TN MEM 680,515  682,024  679,404  
Minneapolis-St.Paul, MN MSP 652,481  652,003  656,659  
Baltimore, MD BWI 640,064  640,961  640,150  
Charlotte, NC CLT 631,160  652,202  669,690  
El Paso, TX ELP 587,400  595,980  600,402  
Milwaukee, WI MKE 601,983  602,782  602,656  
Seattle, WA SEA 575,036  582,877  592,647  
Boston, MA BOS 609,690  612,192  622,748  
                     a includes Dallas, Arlington, Fort Worth and Plano 
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Table 1 Continued 
Cites, airports and population 
City, State Airports 
City pop. 
2005 2006 2007 
Louisville, KY SDF 559,855  559,709  562,632  
Washington, DC DCA, IAD 582,049  583,978  586,409  
Nashville, TN BNA 579,748  586,327  592,503  
Las Vegas, NV LAS 544,806  552,855  559,892  
Portland, OR PDX 534,112  538,091  546,747  
Oklahoma City, OK OKC 532,006  539,001  545,910  
Tucson, AZ TUS 524,830  530,349  536,752  
Albuquerque, NM ABQ 497,543  508,486  517,162  
Long Beach, CA LGB 467,851  463,723  459,925  
New Orleans, LA MSY 455,188  208,548  288,113  
Cleveland, OH CLE 449,188  442,409  438,068  
Sacramento, CA SMF 448,842  449,658  455,760  
Kansas City, MO MCI 463,983  470,076  475,830  
Atlanta, GA ATL 483,108  498,208  519,569  
Omaha, NE OMA 432,148  437,523  442,452  
Oakland, CA OAK 392,112  392,076  397,441  
Tulsa, OK TUL 381,017  382,394  384,592  
Miami, FL MIA 390,768  412,460  424,662  
Colorado Springs, CO COS 393,804  398,778  399,751  
Wichita, KS ICT 354,524  356,592  360,897  
St Louis, MO STL 352,572  353,837  355,663  
Santa Ana, CA SNA 337,121  334,830  335,491  
Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 553,294  574,065  596,049  
Pittsburgh, PA PIT 316,206  313,306  312,322  
Tampa, FL TPA 325,569  332,604  334,852  
Cincinnati, OH CVG 331,310  332,185  333,321  
Ontario, CA ONT 170,630  170,865  171,603  
Buffalo, NY BUF 277,998  274,740  272,492  
Lexington, KY LEX 278,313  283,324  287,263  
Norfolk, VA ORF 237,487  238,832  236,051  
 
 
We eliminate tickets with nominal prices cheaper than $50 and more expensive 
than $2000, those with multiple ticketing carriers, and those containing more than 2 
intermediate stops.  Within each quarter, a given itinerary-airline(s) combination is 
10 
repeated many times, each time at a different price, making the dataset extremely large. To 
make the data more manageable, we collapse the data based on our definition of product 
(unique itinerary-airline(s) combination) for each quarter.  Before collapsing the data, we 
aggregated the number of passengers and averaged market fare over each defined product.  
This is the process by which each defined product’s quantity and price (subsequently 
denoted by 𝑞𝑗  and 𝑝𝑗  respectively) are constructed.  For example, the nonstop itinerary 
from New York to Dallas which is operated and ticketed both by United Airlines is repeated 
3 times in the data, but with different fares $150, $250, and $100, and number of passengers 
5, 8, and 10 that purchase this itinerary at the three distinct prices, respectively.  Then we 
collapse the data to leave only one observation of this product with average market fare of 
$166.67, and aggregate number of passengers equal to 23. Products with quantity less than 
9 passengers for the entire quarter are dropped from the data. 9   Also, we eliminate 
monopoly markets, i.e. markets in which only one carrier provides product(s).  The 
collapsed data have 434,329 quarter-specific observations (products) spread across 32,680 
quarter-specific origin-destination markets. 
From the collapsed dataset, observed product market shares (subsequently denoted 
by upper case 𝑆𝑗) are created by dividing quantity of product 𝑗 sold (𝑞𝑗) by the geometric 
mean of the origin city and destination city populations (subsequently denoted by POP), 
i.e. 𝑆𝑗 =
𝑞𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃⁄ .
10  Other variables that capture air travel product characteristics are 
created for estimation.  One measure of travel convenience of an air travel product is 
captured by the variable, Interstops.  Interstops counts the number of intermediate stop(s) 
required by the air travel product in transporting a passenger from the origin to destination 
city.  Our presumption is that the typical passenger dislikes intermediate stops, but the 
                                                             
9 Berry (1992), Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others use a similar, and sometimes more stringent, 
quantity threshold to help eliminate idiosyncratic product offerings that are not part of the normal set of 
products offered in a market. 
 
10  POP is measured by: 𝑃𝑂𝑃 = √𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛.  Due to the fact that 
population magnitudes are significantly larger than quantity sold for any given air travel product, observed 
product shares, computed as described above,  are extremely small numbers. We therefore scale up all product 
shares in the data by a common factor.  The common factor is the largest integer such that the outside good 
share (𝑆0 = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 ) in each market remains positive.  The common factor that satisfies these conditions 
in the data set is 35.  
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demand estimation will verify whether this presumption is consistent with consumer choice 
behavior patterns in the data.   
Another measure of the travel convenience of an air travel product is captured by 
the variable, Inconvenience.  Inconvenience is defined as the flying distance (measured in 
miles, and represented by the variable Market miles flown) required by the travel itinerary 
in getting passengers from the origin to destination city, divided by the nonstop flying 
distance between the origin and destination cities.  The minimum value for variable 
Inconvenience, which is equal to 1, implies the most travel-convenient itinerary for a given 
market.  Furthermore, for a set of products with equivalent number of intermediate stops, 
the Inconvenience variable is able to distinguish between these products in terms of the 
“directness” of the routing between the origin and destination since the locations of 
intermediate stop(s) may differ across these products, which in turn cause the flying 
distance to differ across these products.  Again, our presumption is that a typical passenger 
prefers more direct routing between their origin and destination, which will be tested by 
our demand estimation.     
We measure the size of an airline's presence at the endpoint cities of a market from 
different perspectives.  The variable Opres_out is a count of the number of different cities 
that the airline offers nonstop flights to, leaving from the origin city.  On the other hand, 
Opres_in counts the number of different cities that the airline provides nonstop flights from, 
coming into the origin city of the market.  We also construct a destination presence variable 
Dpres_out, which measures the number of distinct cities that the airline has nonstop flights 
to, leaving from the destination city. 
Opres_out is intended to help explain consumers' choice between airlines at the 
consumer's origin city.  The presumption here is that a consumer is more likely to choose 
the airline that offers nonstop service to more cities from the consumer's origin city.  On 
the other hand, the Opres_in and Dpres_out may better explain an airline's cost of 
transporting passengers in a market.  The argument is that due to possible economies of 
passenger-traffic density, an airline's marginal cost of transporting a passenger in a market 
is lower as the volume of passengers the airline channels through the market increases.  An 
airline with large measures of Opres_in and Dpres_out for a given market, is likely to 
12 
channel a large volume of passengers through the market, and therefore is expected to have 
lower marginal cost of transporting a passenger in the market.  
We only identify codeshare products between major carriers, i.e. following much 
of the literature on airline codesharing, we do not consider products between regional and 
major carriers as codeshare.  For example, a product that involves American Eagle (MQ) 
and American Airlines (AA), where one of them is the ticketing carrier and the other is an 
operating carrier, is still considered by us to be pure online since American Eagle is a 
regional airline that serves for American Airlines.  
Traditional Codeshare and Virtual Codeshare are zero-one dummy variables that 
take a value of 1 when the itinerary is identified to be traditional codeshared and virtual 
codeshared respectively.  Among the codeshare products in a market, variables Percent 
Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline measure the percentage of these 
products of a given codeshare type (Traditional and Virtual respectively) an airline offers 
for sale to consumers. As such, the measured percentage values in each of these codeshare 
variables vary across airlines and markets.  These two variables are constructed to capture 
the extent to which each airline engages in codesharing of a given type across markets in 
the sample.  
Summary statistics of the variables used for estimation are presented in Table 2.  
The variable Fare is measured in constant year 1999 dollars.  We use the consumer price 
index to deflate Fare.  
Table 3 presents a list of ticketing carriers in the dataset according to type of 
products that each airline provides.  The first two columns show that there are 21 airlines 
involved in pure online products.  All airlines in the dataset provide pure online products. 
The next two columns in Table 3 show that, among all airlines in the dataset, 10 are 
involved in codeshare products and 7 of these airlines are the ones we classify as legacy 
carriers.  The fifth column in Table 3 reports the percent of codeshare products in the 
sample that each carrier offers for sale to consumers.  The data in this column reveal that 
the vast majority (approximately 83 percent) of codeshare products are provided by legacy 
carriers. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics for the Dataset  
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Farea 166.35 52.19 45.08 1,522.46 
Quantity 149.57 508.25 9 11,643 
Opres_out 29.05 28.35 0 177 
Opres_in 29.03 28.30 0 177 
Dpres_out 29.13 28.47 0 177 
Interstops  0.87 0.40 0 2 
Market miles flown 1,542.34 695.27 67 4,156 
Nonstop miles 1,371.42 648.60 67 2,724 
Inconvenience 1.15 0.21 1 2.975 
Traditional Codeshare 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Virtual Codeshare 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Percent Traditional for Airline 3.03 13.94 0 100 
Percent Virtual for Airline 3.78 16.44 0 100 
Observed Product Shares (Sj) 0.0067 0.02 5.45E-05 0.97 
Number of Products 434,329    
Number of Markets 32,680       
Notes:  a The variable “Fare” is measured in constant year 1999 dollars. We use the  
consumer price index to deflate “Fare”. 
 
 
The last column in Table 3 reports the percent of each carrier’s codeshare products 
that are codeshared with legacy carriers.  Noticeably, almost all of each legacy carrier’s 
codeshare products are codeshared with other legacy carriers, and moreover, ATA and 
Southwest Airlines, which are low-cost carriers, do not codeshare with legacy carriers.  An 
exception to this pattern is Frontier Airlines, a low-cost carrier that has 91 percent of its 
codeshare products codeshared with a legacy carrier (typically with Alaska Airlines).  
However, the previous column shows that codeshare products offered by Frontier Airlines 
only account for 0.07 percent of total codeshare products offered.  In summary, the data 
reveal that a substantial amount of codeshare alliances are formed between legacy carriers.  
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 Table 3 
 List of Airlines in the Dataset,  
by Product type they offer to Consumers 
Airlines Involved in  
Pure online Products 
 
  
Airlines that offer  
Codeshare Products to consumers 
Airlines Name Code 
 
 
Airlines Name Code 
Percent of 
codeshare 
products in 
the sample 
Percent of each 
carrier’s codeshare 
products codeshared 
with legacy carriers   
 
  
American Airlines Inc. AA   Legacy Carriers    
Aloha Airlines AQ       American Airlines Inc. AA 13.47 98.87 
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS       Alaska Airlines Inc. AS 7.87 100 
JetBlue Airways B6       Continental Air Lines Inc. CO 5.76 100 
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO       Delta Air Lines Inc. DL 4.76 99.88 
Independence Air DH       Northwest Airlines Inc. NW 10.03 100 
Delta Air Lines Inc. DL       United Air Lines Inc. UA 28.75 100 
Frontier Airlines Inc. F9       US Airways Inc. US 12.56 99.82 
AirTran Airways  FL   Sub-total  83.20  
Allegiant Air G4   Low Cost Carriers    
America West Airlines Inc. HP       Southwest Airlines Co. WN 9.28 0 
Spirit Air Lines NK       ATA Airlines  TZ 7.45 0 
Northwest Airlines Inc. NW       Frontier Airlines Inc. F9 0.07 91.67 
Skybus Airlines, Inc. SX   Sub-total  16.80  
Sun Country Airlines SY   Total  100  
ATA Airlines  TZ       
United Air Lines Inc. UA       
US Airways Inc. US       
Southwest Airlines Co. WN       
ExpressJet Airlines Inc. XE       
Midwest Airlines YX       
  
           
Notes:  The carries we classify as Legacy carriers include: American Airline, Alaska Airlines, Continental 
Air, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Air Lines, and US Airways. 
 
Table 4 summarizes our data according to the three types of products.  Among 
codeshared products, the number of traditional codeshared products is slightly less than the 
number of virtual codeshared products, but twice as many passengers travel on virtual 
codeshared products compared to traditional codeshare products. The descriptive statistics 
in Table 4 reveal that only 1.25% of total US domestic air travel passengers travel on 
codeshare products.  With such a small percentage of US domestic air travel passengers 
using codeshare products, it is tempting to use this as justification to not study the effects 
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of codesharing in US domestic air travel markets.  However, it is important to note that 
while a small percentage of total US domestic air travel passengers travel on codeshare 
products, the distribution of the percentage of passengers that travel on codeshare products 
across  US domestic air travel markets is skewed.  In other words, even though in a majority 
of markets relatively few passengers use codeshare products, there exists many markets in 
which a substantial percentage of passengers use codeshare products.  Table 5 provides 
summary statistics evidence revealing that passengers are substantially more exposed to 
the practice of codesharing in some markets more than others, furthermore, the percentage 
of passengers using codeshare products in some markets can be substantial.             
Table 4 
Classification of Cooperative Agreement in Data Set 
Classification 
Observations/Products   Passengers 
Frequency Percent   Frequency Percent 
Pure online 416,537  95.90   64,150,292  98.75  
Traditional Codeshare 8,847  2.04   254,065  0.39  
Virtual Codeshare 8,945  2.06   558,095  0.86  
Total 434,329  100.00    64,962,452  100.00  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 reveals that as many as 1,513 markets have between 5% and 10% of the 
market’s passengers traveling on codeshare products, 456 markets have between 10% and 
20% of the market’s passengers traveling on codeshare products, while 46 markets have 
between 20% and 50% of the market’s passengers traveling on codeshare products.  In 
summary, the descriptive statistics in Table 5 provide sufficient reason for us to better 
understand the market effects of airline codesharing.     
Table 5 
Passengers use of Codeshare Products Across Markets 
Percentage Interval of Consumers in the market that 
use Codeshare Products 
Number of Market that fall within 
the Percentage Interval 
0% < 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 ≤ 5% 6652 
5% < 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 ≤ 10% 1513 
10% < 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 ≤ 20% 456 
20% < 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 ≤ 50% 46 
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As we explain in subsequent sections of the paper, the short-run demand and supply 
sides of the model are estimated using the data at the product-market-time period level, 
while the dynamic entry/exit model is estimated using the data aggregated up to the airline-
market-time period level.  Since the data contain many more airlines than the dynamic 
entry/exit model can feasibly handle, at the stage of estimating the dynamic model, we 
impose additional restrictions to be able to estimate the dynamic model.  A restrictive 
assumption we make is that a set of the airlines in our data can reasonably be lumped into 
an “Other low-cost carriers” category and treated as if the “Other low-cost carriers” is a 
single carrier.  Similar to many studies in the literature [e.g. Brueckner, Lee and Singer 
(2012), Morrison (2001) among others], Southwest Airlines is the low-cost carrier that we 
treat separately than other low-cost carriers.  So the “Other low-cost carriers” category 
includes all low-cost carriers except Southwest Airlines. 
By using the number of passengers as a threshold to define whether or not an airline 
is active in a market, we are able to identify the number of markets that each airline has 
entered and exited. We define an airline to be active in a directional origin-destination 
market during a quarter if at least 130 passengers travel on products offered for sale by the 
airline in this market during the quarter.11  Each airline's market entry and exit decisions 
contained in the data are crucial for us to be able to estimate fixed and entry costs, since 
the dynamic entry/exit model relies on the optimality assumption that potential entrants 
will only enter a market if the one-time entry cost is less than the expected discounted 
future stream of profits, and an incumbent will exit a market when per-period fixed cost 
becomes sufficiently high relative to per-period variable profits such that the expected 
discounted future stream of profits is non-positive.  Therefore, it is useful to get a sense of 
the extent to which the data contain information relevant for identifying fixed and entry 
costs from the dynamic model.   
Table 6 reports the number of market entry and exit events by airline.  The table 
shows that each airline has several market entry and exit events, but most airlines have 
more market entry than market exit events, and overall there are substantially more entry 
                                                             
11 Our passenger threshold of 130 for a directional market is equivalent to the 260 for non-directional market 
used by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012).  
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than exit events.  This suggests that we might be better able to identify entry cost than fixed 
cost.  
 
Table 6 
Number of market entry and exit events by airline  
Airlines 
 
Number of market entry 
events 
Number of market exit 
events 
American Airlines Inc. 498 332 
Continental Air Lines Inc. 372 303 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 348 360 
Northwest Airlines Inc. 323 309 
United Air Lines Inc. 316 259 
US Airways Inc. 655 151 
Alaska Airlines Inc. 22 12 
Southwest Airlines Co. 262 105 
Other low cost carriers  368 625 
Overall 3,164 2,456 
 
3. Model 
3.1 Demand  
Similar to Gayle (2013), air travel demand is modeled using a random coefficients 
logit model.  There are POP potential consumers, who may either buy one of J 
differentiated air travel products in a market, indexed by j = 1,…,J, or otherwise choose 
the outside good (j = 0, i.e., good 0), e.g. driving, taking a train, or not traveling at all.  
Each potential consumer, indexed by c, chooses the travel option that gives him the highest 
utility, that is, we assume each potential consumer solves the following discrete choice 
optimization problem:  
 max
𝑗𝜖{0,…,𝐽}
{𝑈𝑐𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗𝜙𝑐
𝑥 + 𝜙𝑐
𝑝𝑝𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜀𝑐𝑗
𝑑 } (1) 
where 𝑈𝑐𝑗 is the value of travel option j to consumer c; 𝑥𝑗 is a vector of observed non-price 
characteristics of product j; 12  𝜙𝑐
𝑥  is a vector of consumer-specific marginal utilities 
(assumed to vary randomly across consumers) associated with non-price characteristics in 
                                                             
12 Non-price product characteristic variables in 𝑥𝑗 include: (1) Opres_out; (2) Interstops; (3) Inconvenience; 
(4) Traditional Codeshare; (5) Virtual Codeshare; (6) Percent Traditional for Airline; (7) Percent Virtual for 
Airline; (8) quarter fixed effects; (9) year fixed effects; (10) ticketing carrier fixed effects; (11) market origin 
fixed effects; and (12) market destination fixed effects.   
18 
𝑥𝑗;  𝑝𝑗 is the price the consumer must pay to obtain product j; 𝜙𝑐
𝑝
 is the consumer-specific 
marginal utility of price, which is assumed to vary randomly across consumers; 𝜉𝑗capture 
product characteristics that are observed by consumers and airlines, but not observed by us 
the researchers; and 𝜀𝑐𝑗
𝑑  is a mean-zero random component of utility. 
 The random coefficients vary across consumers based on the following 
specification:  
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 (2) 
where 𝜙𝑝 is the mean (across consumers) marginal utility of price;  𝜙𝑥 is a vector of mean 
marginal utilities for respective non-price product characteristics; 𝜙𝑣 = (𝜙𝑝
𝑣 , 𝜙1
𝑣, … , 𝜙𝐿
𝑣) is 
a set of parameters that measure variation across consumers in random taste shocks for 
respective product characteristics; and  𝑣𝑐 = (𝑣𝑐𝑝, 𝑣𝑐1, … , 𝑣𝑐𝐿) is a set of consumer c's 
random taste shocks for respective product characteristics.  We assume that 𝑣𝑐 follows a 
standard normal probability distribution across consumers.  
 Following much of the literature on discrete choice demand model [see Nevo 
(2000)], we assume that 𝜀𝑐𝑗
𝑑  in equation (1) is governed by an independent and identically 
distributed extreme value probability density.  As such, the probability that product j is 
chosen, or equivalently the predicted market share of product j is:   
 𝑠𝑗(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑝𝑗,𝜉𝑗; 𝜙
𝑥, 𝜙𝑝, 𝜙𝑣) = ∫
exp(𝛿𝑗 + 𝜇𝑐𝑗)
1 + ∑ exp(𝛿𝑘 + 𝜇𝑐𝑘)
𝐽
𝑘
𝑑𝐺(𝑣) (3) 
where 𝛿𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥 + 𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗 is the mean utility obtained across consumers who choose 
product j; 𝜇𝑐𝑗 = 𝜙𝑝
𝑣𝑝𝑗𝑣𝑐𝑝 + ∑ 𝜙𝑙
𝑣𝑥𝑗𝑙𝑣𝑐𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1  is a consumer-specific deviation from the mean 
utility level; and 𝐺(∙) is the standard normal distribution function for the taste shocks.  
Since there is no closed-form solution for the integral in equation (3), this integral is 
approximated numerically using random draws from 𝐺(𝑣). 13 
                                                             
13 We use 200 random draws from 𝐺(∙) for the numerical approximation of  𝑠𝑗(∙). 
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 The quantity demand for product j is simply specified to equal to the probability 
that product j is chosen times the total number of potential consumers, POP: 
 𝑑𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉; Φ
d) × 𝑃𝑂𝑃 (4) 
where Φd = (𝜙𝑝, 𝜙𝑥 , 𝜙𝑣) is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated. 
 
3.2 Supply  
The ticketing carrier of a codeshare product markets and sets the final price for the 
round-trip ticket and compensates the operating carrier for operating services provided.  
Unfortunately for researchers, partner airlines do not publicize details of how they 
compensate each other on their codeshare flights.  Therefore, our challenge as researchers 
is to specify a modeling approach that captures our basic understanding of what is 
commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works without imposing too much 
structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts.  As such, we follow the 
modeling approach outlined in Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013). 
Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013) suggest that for modeling purposes a 
codeshare agreement can be thought of as a privately negotiated pricing contract between 
partners (𝑤, Γ) , where 𝑤 is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an 
operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while Γ represents a potential lump-sum 
transfer between partners that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  For the 
purposes of this paper we do not need to econometrically identify an equilibrium value of 
Γ, but in describing the dynamic part of the model, we do show where Γ enters the model. 
Suppose the final price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential 
price-setting game, where in the first stage of the sequential process the operating carrier 
sets price, 𝑤, for transporting a passenger using its own plane(s), and privately makes this 
price known to its partner ticketing carrier.  In the second stage, conditional on the agreed 
upon price 𝑤 for services supplied by the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the 
final round-trip price 𝑝  for the codeshare product.  The final subgame in this sequential 
price-setting game is played between ticketing carriers, and produces the final ticket prices 
observed by consumers. 
Each ticketing carrier 𝑖 solves the following profit maximization problem: 
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max
𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 ∀ 𝑗∈𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡
= max
𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 ∀ 𝑗∈𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡
[ ∑ (𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡)𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑗∈𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡
] 
(5) 
where 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the variable profit carrier 𝑖 obtains in market m during period t by offering 
the set of products 𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡 to consumers,  𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡 is the quantity of tickets for product j sold in 
market m, 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡 is the price of product j, and 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 is the effective marginal cost incurred 
by ticketing carrier 𝑖  from offering product j.  
 Let 𝑓 = 1, … , 𝐹  index the corresponding operating carriers.  If product 𝑗  is a 
traditional codeshare product, then 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
, where 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖  is the marginal cost 
that ticketing carrier 𝑖 incurs by using its own plane to provide transportation services on 
some segment(s) of the trip needed for product 𝑗, while 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
 is the price ticketing carrier 𝑖 
pays to operating carrier 𝑓 for its transportation services on the remaining trip segment(s).  
If instead product 𝑗 is a virtual codeshare product, then 𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
, where 𝑤𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑓
 is the 
price the ticketing carrier pays to operating carrier 𝑓  for its exclusive transportation 
services in the provision of product 𝑗.14  Last, if product 𝑗 is a pure online product, then 
𝑚𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑖 .  In the case of a pure online product, the ticketing carrier is also the sole 
operating carrier of product 𝑗, i.e., 𝑖 = 𝑓. 
 In equilibrium, the amount of product 𝑗 an airline sells is equal to the quantity 
demanded, that is, 𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑑𝑗𝑚𝑡 = 𝑠𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑝, 𝑥, 𝜉; Φ
d) × 𝑃𝑂𝑃.  The optimization problem in 
(5) yields the following set of J first-order conditions – one for each of the J products in 
the market:  
 
 ∑ (𝑝𝑘 − 𝑚𝑐𝑘)
𝜕𝑠𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑗
+ 𝑠𝑗
𝑘∈𝐵𝑖
= 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 (6) 
We have dropped the market and time subscripts in equation (6) only to avoid a clutter of 
notation.  The set of first-order conditions can be represented in matrix notation as follows:  
                                                             
14 The implicit assumption here is that the ticketing carrier of a virtual codeshare product only incurs fixed 
expenses in marketing the product to potential passengers. 
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 (𝛺.∗ 𝛥) × (𝑝 − 𝑚𝑐) + 𝑠 = 0 (7) 
where p, mc, and s are J×1 vectors of product prices, marginal costs, and predicted product 
shares respectively, Ω is a J×J matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones that 
capture ticketing carriers’ “ownership” structure of the J products in a market, .∗ is the 
operator for element-by-element matrix multiplication, and Δ is a J×J matrix of own and 
cross-price effects, where element ∆𝑗𝑘=
𝜕𝑠𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑗
.  Since for purposes of the model the ticketing 
carrier is considered the “owner” of a product, in the discussion that follows, “airline” is 
synonymous with ticketing carrier. 
Equation (7) can be re-arranged to yield a vector of product markups: 
 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝(𝑥, 𝜉; Φd) = 𝑝 − 𝑚𝑐 = −(𝛺.∗ 𝛥)−1 × 𝑠 (8) 
Based on equations (5) and (8), and with estimates of demand parameters in hand, Φd̂, 
firm-level variable profit can be computed by:  
 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑥, 𝜉; Φ
d̂)𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡
𝑗∈𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡
 (9) 
 
3.3 Dynamic Entry/Exit Game 
In the dynamic entry/exit game, each airline chooses markets in which to be active 
during specific time periods.  An airline being active in a market means that the airline 
actually sells products to consumers in the market even though a subset of those products 
may use the operating services of the airline’s codeshare partner carriers.  Each airline 
optimally makes this decision in order to maximize its expected discounted stream of profit:  
 𝐸𝑡 (∑ 𝛽
𝑟𝛱𝑖𝑚,𝑡+𝑟
∞
𝑟=0
) (10) 
where 𝛽 ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and  𝛱𝑖𝑚,𝑡+𝑟 is the per-period profit of airline 𝑖 in 
origin-destination market m.  Airline i’s per-period profit is: 
 
 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑚𝑡 (11) 
where 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 represents the variable profit of airline i in origin-destination market m  during 
period t that is computed from the previously discussed differentiated products Nash price-
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setting game;  𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1 is a zero-one indicator that equals 1 only if airline i had made the 
decision in period t-1 to be active in market m during period t, therefore 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 1 only if 
airline i makes decision in period t to be active in market m during period t+1;  and 𝐹𝑖𝑚𝑡 is 
the sum of fixed and entry costs of airline i in market m during period t.   
 It is important to note that the time subscript on indicator variable 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡 identifies 
the period in which the airline makes a decision regarding being active or not in a market, 
but the decision does not become effective until the subsequent period.  In other words, an 
airline that is active in a market during period t and earning variable profit 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 is a 
consequence of the airline making this decision in period t -1 to be active in period t.  This 
is commonly referred to as a time-to-build assumption since it is assumed that once a 
decision is made to become active in a market, it will take a full period for the airline to 
implement the necessary plans for actual operations.  Note however, that the time subscript 
on 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡  identifies the period in which the variable profit is earned, and the time subscript 
on 𝐹𝑖𝑚𝑡 identifies the period in which the relevant costs are incurred and paid. 
Let 𝐹𝑖𝑚𝑡 be specified as: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑚𝑡  = 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐹𝐶
+ (1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1)[𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶 ] 
(12) 
where 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 represents the deterministic part of per-period fixed cost of operating flights 
in origin-destination market m. The component 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐹𝐶  represents a private firm-idiosyncratic 
shock to airline i’s fixed cost.  The fixed cost 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐹𝐶  is paid now only if the airline 
decides to be active in market m next period, i.e., if 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 1.   
 The entry cost 𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 + 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶   has four components; 𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡  is a 
deterministic component, while 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 , 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 , and 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶   represent shocks to entry cost. 
Shocks 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 only vary by market and time and are observed by firms, but not 
by us the researchers, while 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶  represents a private firm-idiosyncratic shock to airline i’s 
entry cost.  The entry cost is paid only when the airline is not active in market m at period 
t but it decides to be active in the market next period, i.e., if 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1 = 0 and 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 1. 
 Let the composite private firm-idiosyncratic shock to airline i’s fixed and entry costs 
be denoted by 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡 .  Based on equation (12), 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐹𝐶 + (1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1)𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝐸𝐶  .  We 
assume that the composite private information shock, 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡, is independently and identically 
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distributed over firms, markets and time, and has a type 1 extreme value  probability 
distribution function. 
The deterministic portions of fixed and entry costs are specified as: 
 
 𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝜃0
𝐹𝐶 + 𝜃1
𝐹𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 (13) 
 
  𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝜃0
𝐸𝐶 + 𝜃1
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡                
+ 𝜃2
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡   
+ 𝜃3
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡
+ 𝜃4
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 × 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡
+ 𝜃5
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 × 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡
+ 𝜃6
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑐𝑐
+ 𝜃7
𝐸𝐶𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑐𝑐 
(14) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the mean across size-of-presence variables Opres_in and Dpres_out for 
airline i at the endpoint cities of market m; 15 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 is the percent of products 
in market m during period t that are traditional codeshare; 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 is the 
percent of products in market m during period t that are virtual codeshare; Southwest is a 
zero-one dummy variable that equals to one only if the airline is Southwest; 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑐𝑐 is 
a zero-one dummy variable that equals to one for low-cost carriers other than Southwest; 
and {𝜃0
𝐹𝐶 , 𝜃1
𝐹𝐶 , 𝜃0
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃1
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃2
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃3
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃4
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃5
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃6
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃7
𝐸𝐶}  is the set of structural parameters 
to be estimated. 
𝜃0
𝐹𝐶  measures mean (across airlines, markets and time) fixed cost, while  𝜃1
𝐹𝐶  
measures the effect that size of an airline's city presence has on fixed cost.  The mean 
recurrent fixed cost parameter 𝜃0
𝐹𝐶  may comprise fixed expenses incurred by a ticketing 
carrier when the carrier markets a codeshare product to potential consumers.  In our 
previous discussion we define (𝑤, Γ) as a privately negotiated codeshare contract between 
partner carriers, where 𝑤 is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays an operating 
carrier for transporting the passenger, while Γ represents a potential lump-sum transfer 
between partners that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  It was shown that 𝑤 
enters the effective marginal cost of the ticketing carrier.  However, the lump-sum transfer 
                                                             
15 As we previously defined in the section, Definitions and Data, Opres_in is a variable that counts the 
number of different cities that the airline provides nonstop flights from, going into the origin city of the 
market, while variable Dpres_out counts the number of distinct cities that the airline has nonstop flights to, 
leaving from the destination city. 
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between partners, Γ, is nested in 𝜃0
𝐹𝐶 , but we do not attempt to separately identify Γ since 
knowing its value is not essential for the purposes of our paper. 
𝜃0
𝐸𝐶  measures mean (across airlines, markets and time) entry cost – we also allow 
mean entry cost to differ by the three carrier-types we consider (Legacy, Southwest and 
Other low cost carriers), in which case 𝜃0
𝐸𝐶  would be a vector containing three parameters.  
The coefficient on 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 is 𝜃1
𝐸𝐶 , which measures the effect that size of an airline's city 
presence has on entry cost.  Parameter 𝜃2
𝐸𝐶   measures the impact that traditional 
codesharing between incumbent airlines have on market entry costs of legacy carriers that 
are potential entrants to the relevant market, while 𝜃2
𝐸𝐶 + 𝜃4
𝐸𝐶  captures the impact on 
Southwest's market entry cost, and 𝜃2
𝐸𝐶 + 𝜃6
𝐸𝐶  captures the impact on other low-cost 
carrier's market entry cost.  Hence, testing whether 𝜃4
𝐸𝐶   and 𝜃6
𝐸𝐶   are positive tells us 
whether traditional codesharing among incumbents increases the barrier to entry for 
Southwest or other low-cost carriers, respectively.  In the case of virtual codesharing, 
parameter 𝜃3
𝐸𝐶  measures the impact that virtual codesharing between incumbent airlines 
have on market entry costs of legacy carriers that are potential entrants to the relevant 
market, while 𝜃3
𝐸𝐶 + 𝜃5
𝐸𝐶  captures the impact on Southwest's market entry cost, and 𝜃3
𝐸𝐶 +
𝜃7
𝐸𝐶  captures the impact on other low-cost carrier's market entry cost.  Hence, testing 
whether 𝜃5
𝐸𝐶  and 𝜃7
𝐸𝐶  are positive tells us whether virtual codesharing among incumbents 
increases the barrier to entry for Southwest or other low-cost carriers, respectively. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 measure the extent of codesharing that 
takes place in a market.  For the sake of not making the model overly complex and difficult 
to estimate, we chose not to explicitly model airlines' optimizing decision of whether or 
not to codeshare in a market.  However, it is reasonable to conjecture that airlines' 
optimizing decision of whether or not to codeshare is influenced by the effective cost an 
airline faces to use its own planes to begin providing service in the market (part of its 
market entry cost).  This further suggests that shocks to market entry cost that are 
unobserved to us, 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑  and 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 , are likely to influence 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡  and 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 respectively.  As such, we formally specify the following equations: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 = 𝑍𝑚𝑡𝛾 + 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑                                        (15) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 = 𝑍𝑚𝑡𝜆 + 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡                                        (16) 
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where 𝑍𝑚𝑡 is a matrix of variables that influence the extent of traditional and virtual 
codesharing that takes place in a market; 𝛾  and 𝜆 are vectors of parameters associated with 
these variables in equations (15) and (16) respectively; while 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 are assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed normal random variables with mean zero 
and standard deviations 𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝜎𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 respectively.  Therefore, the model accounts for 
the endogeneity of variables 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 in the entry cost 
function.   
The variables we include in 𝑍𝑚𝑡 are: (1) the geometric mean of the origin city and 
destination city populations (POP), which is a measure of market size; (2) nonstop flight 
distance between the origin and destination; (3) one-period lag of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) computed based on the relative sizes of airlines' presence at the 
market endpoint cities, where an airline's size of city presence is measured by the 
previously defined variables, Opres_in and Dpres_out; 16 (4) origin city fixed effects; (5) 
destination city fixed effects; and (6) quarter fixed effects. 
Our specified equations do not include a firm-specific component of fixed cost and 
entry cost for two reasons.  First, estimation of the dynamic model is computationally quite 
intensive, and convergence is difficult to achieve when the number of parameters being 
optimized over is large.  Even with the model restricted to 10 parameters and four quarters 
of data, optimization took approximately seven days of continuously running the computer 
program.  Second, even without firm-specific parameters, the fixed and entry cost functions 
do capture some heterogeneity across firms via the firm-specific variable 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡. 
 
 
Reducing the dimensionality of the dynamic game 
From the previously discussed Nash price-setting game, firm-level variable profit 
is: 𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝑥, ξ; Φ
d) = ∑ 𝑚𝑘𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑡(𝑥,𝑗∈𝐵𝑖𝑚𝑡 ξ; Φ
d) ∗ 𝑞𝑗𝑚𝑡.  Let 
 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ = 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1𝑉𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 (18) 
Note that (x, ξ) are state variables that are needed in the dynamic entry/exit game.  As 
                                                             
16 Opres_in is a variable that counts the number of different cities that the airline provides nonstop flights 
from, going into the origin city of the market, while variable Dpres_out counts the number of distinct cities 
that the airline has nonstop flights to, leaving from the destination city. 
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pointed out and discussed in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗  aggregates these state 
variables in an economically meaningful way so that these state variables can enter the 
dynamic game through 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ .  Therefore, as a simplifying assumption, Aguirregabiria and 
Ho (2012) recommend treating 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗  as a firm-specific state variable, rather than treating x 
and ξ as separate state variables.  Though restrictive, this simplifying assumption 
substantially reduces the dimensionality of the state space to make estimation feasible.  The 
payoff-relevant information of firm i in market m is: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡 ≡
          {𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡, 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑, 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡}
. 
(19
) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝑚,𝑡−1. 
Each airline has its own vector of state variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡 , and airlines take into 
account these variables when making decisions.  It might seem that each airline does not 
take into account the strategies that other airlines adopt.  However, an airline’s vector of 
state variables, 𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡, depends on previous period entry and exit decisions of other airlines.  
For example, the variable profit state variable, 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ , depends on competition from other 
incumbents currently in the market, which implies that this state variable depends on the 
previous period’s entry/exit decisions of other airlines.  Accordingly, our entry/exit model 
incorporates dynamic strategic interactions among airlines. 
Let 𝜎 ≡ {𝜎𝑖𝑚(𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡), 𝑖 = 1,2, . . , 𝑁; 𝑚 = 1,2, … , 𝑀}  be a set of strategy 
functions, one for each airline.  𝜎 is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) if the profile of 
strategies in 𝜎 maximizes the expected value of airline i at every state (𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡) given 
the opponent’s strategy.  
 
Value Function and Bellman Equation 
For notational convenience, we drop the market subscript. Let 𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) be the 
value function for airline i given that the other airlines behave according to their respective 
strategies in 𝜎. The value function is the unique solution to the Bellman equation: 
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𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡)
= Max
𝑎𝑖𝑡∈{0,1}
{𝛱𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) − 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽 ∫ 𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1, 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1) 𝑑𝐺𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑡+1)𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡)} 
(20) 
where 𝛱𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) and 𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) are the expected one-period profit and expected 
transition of state variables, respectively, for airline i given the strategies of the other 
airlines. The profile of strategies in 𝜎 is a MPE if, for every airline i and every state (𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡), 
we have: 
 
𝜎𝑖(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡)
= 𝑎𝑟𝑔max
𝑎𝑖𝑡
{ 𝛱𝑖𝑡
𝜎(𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) − 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝛽 ∫ 𝑉𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1, 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1) 𝑑𝐺𝑖(𝜀𝑖𝑡+1)𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡)} 
(21) 
The transition rules we use for state variables are described in Appendix A.  In Appendix 
B we illustrate that the MPE can also be represented as a vector of conditional choice 
probabilities (CCPs) that solves the fixed point problem 𝑷 = 𝜓(𝑷, 𝜃) , where 𝐏 =
{𝑃𝑖(𝐲): for every firm and state (𝑖, 𝒚)}.   𝑷 = 𝜓(𝑷, 𝜃)  is a vector of best response 
probability mapping, where 𝜓(∙) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution. 
 
4. Estimation and Results 
4.1 Estimation of demand  
 The demand model is estimated using Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM).  
Following Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2000), we can 
solve for 𝜉𝑗  as a function of demand parameters and the data, where 𝜉𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥 −
𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗.  𝜉𝑗  is the error term used to formulate the GMM optimization problem: 
 
 min
𝜙𝑥,𝜙𝑝,𝜙𝑣
𝜉′𝑍𝑑𝑊𝑍𝑑′𝜉 (22) 
where 𝑍𝑑 is the matrix of instruments that are assumed orthogonal to the error 
vector 𝜉 , while W is the standard weighting matrix, 𝑊 = [
1
𝑛
𝑍𝑑′𝜉𝜉′𝑍𝑑]
−1
.  Since 
parameters 𝜙𝑝  and 𝜙𝑥  enter the error term linearly, we can restructure the GMM 
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optimization problem in (22) such that the search to minimize the objective function, 
𝜉′𝑍𝑑𝑊𝑍𝑑′𝜉, is done exclusively over parameter vector 𝜙𝑣, i.e., the GMM optimization 
problem reduces to min
𝜙𝑣
𝜉′𝑍𝑑𝑊𝑍𝑑′𝜉.  Once the optimization over 𝜙𝑣 is complete, we can 
recover estimates of  𝜙𝑝 and 𝜙𝑥.17      
Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline are two of the non-
price product characteristic variables in 𝑥𝑗.  Among the codeshare products in a market, 
recall that variables Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline measure 
the percentage of these products of a given codeshare type an airline offers for sale to 
consumers.  Since airlines optimally choose the extent to which to codeshare with others 
in a market, it is possible that these codeshare variables are correlated with shocks to 
demand captured in 𝜉𝑗 , making Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for 
Airline endogenous in the demand model.  In addition, it is well-known that 𝑝𝑗 is correlated 
with 𝜉𝑗.  Therefore, our estimation of the demand model takes into account the endogeneity 
of 𝑝𝑗 , Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline.  Specifically, 
instruments for these three variables are included in 𝑍𝑑. 
 
Instruments for endogenous variables in demand model 
To obtain a set of valid instruments for price, we exploit the fact that the menu of 
products offered by airlines in a market is predetermined at the time of shocks to demand.  
Furthermore, the non-price characteristics of an airline’s products are primarily determined 
by the route network structure of the airline, and unlike price, this network structure is not 
routinely and easily changed during a short period of time, which mitigates the influence 
of demand shocks on the menu of products offered and their associated non-price 
characteristics.  As such, one set of product price instruments we use are: (1) the squared 
deviation of a product’s itinerary distance from the average itinerary distance of competing 
products offered by other airlines; and (2) the number of competing products offered by 
other airlines, where these competing products have number of intermediate stops 
equivalent to the product in question.  The rationale for these instruments is that they are 
                                                             
17 For details of this estimation algorithm of a random coefficients logit model, see Nevo (2000). 
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measures of the degree of competition that a product faces, which affects the size of a 
product’s markup. 
Similar to Villas-Boas (2007), we also exploit the time dimension of the data to 
construct another set of instruments for price.  Since jet fuel price18 vary over the time span 
of the data, these changes in jet fuel price are likely to affect airlines' marginal cost 
differently because airlines differ in the intensity with which they use fuel owing to 
differences in their route network structure and the size distribution of their aircraft fleet. 
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that airlines do not routinely change their aircraft 
fleet with each change in jet fuel price.  Given that an airline's marginal cost is correlated 
with its product price, and we assume that shocks to jet fuel price are uncorrelated with 𝜉𝑗, 
then the following are another set of valid instruments we use for air travel product price: 
(1) itinerary distance flown; (2) interaction of jet fuel price with itinerary distance flown; 
and (3) interaction of jet fuel price with operating carrier dummies.  
For the variables Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline, we 
adopt two instruments: (i) one-period lag of the squared deviation of an airline’s size 
presence at the market endpoint cities from the average size presence of other airlines at 
the market endpoints; and (ii) the interaction of (i) with nonstop flight distance.  The size 
of an airline's presence at the market endpoints is computed by averaging across variables 
Opres_in and Dpres_out, which are variables we defined in the Definitions and Data 
section.  An airline's measures of Opres_in and Dpres_out at the endpoints of a market are 
more determined by the airline's extended route network structure rather than features of 
the given origin-destination market.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Opres_in 
and Dpres_out are uncorrelated with 𝜉𝑗.  In addition, lower presence for an airline at the 
endpoints of a market makes it more likely that the airline will codeshare with others that 
are already serving the market.  So Opres_in and Dpres_out are in principle good 
instruments for Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline.  Last, we 
allow the influence of an airline's size of presence at the market endpoints on its extent of 
market codesharing to depend on the nonstop flight distance of the market.  This explains 
the rationale for instrument (ii). 
                                                             
18 The jet fuel price we use is U.S. Gulf Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price FOB from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration. 
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4.2 Results from demand estimation  
We begin by estimating a standard logit specification of the demand model, which 
is more restrictive than the random coefficients logit demand model outlined previously in 
the sense that the standard logit model does not allow marginal utilities for product 
characteristics to vary across consumers.  Table 7 reports both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
and Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates of the standard logit model.  First, focusing 
on coefficient estimates for the variable, Fare (𝑝𝑗), we find that even though the sign of 
the OLS and 2SLS coefficient estimates on Fare is consistent with intuition, there is a large 
difference in the size of the two coefficient estimates.  The OLS versus the 2SLS coefficient 
estimates on variables Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline are 
also contrasting in magnitudes.  This preliminary evidence suggests that estimates in the 
OLS regression are biased and inconsistent and thus instruments are needed for these 
potentially endogenous variables.   
To formally confirm that variables Fare, Percent Traditional for Airline and 
Percent Virtual for Airline are endogenous, we perform a Hausman exogeneity test.  The 
result of the Hausman test shown in Table 7 easily rejects the exogeneity of these three 
variables at conventional levels of statistical significance.  To evaluate whether the 
instruments have statistically significant explanatory power of variations in the endogenous 
variables, we estimate first-stage reduced-form regressions for each of the endogenous 
variables.  When Fare is the dependent variable in the reduced-form regression, R-squared 
is 0.321, but when Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for Airline are 
dependent variables, the R-squared values are respectively 0.331 and 0.327.  F-tests of the 
joint statistical significance of the instruments in these first-stage reduced-form regressions 
yield F-statistic values of F(46, 434144) = 1717.50, F(46, 434144) = 115.70, and F(46, 
434144) = 157.91 for the Fare, Percent Traditional for Airline and Percent Virtual for 
Airline regressions, respectively.  In each case the p-value for the F-statistic is 0.000, 
suggesting that the instruments do have statistically significant explanatory power of 
variations in each endogenous variable. 
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Table 7 
Demand Estimation  
 Standard Logit Model 
 Random Coefficients 
Logit Model 
  OLS   2SLS 
  
GMM 
Means (𝜙𝑝 and 𝜙𝑥) Estimates 
Robust 
Std. Error   Estimates 
Robust 
Std. Error 
 
Estimates 
Robust 
Std. Error 
  Fare (in thousand $) -0.9290*** 0.0343  -8.2570*** 0.1669 
 -19.12*** 0.7401 
  Opres_out 0.3973*** 0.0082  0.1841*** 0.0182 
 0.473*** 0.0314 
  Interstops -1.4588*** 0.0060  -1.4 71*** 0.0084 
 -1.495*** 0.0219 
  Inconvenience -0.9491*** 0.0064  -0.9265*** 0.0106 
 -0.760*** 0.0186 
  Traditional Codeshare -0.6827*** 0.0116  -5.1325*** 0.1559 
 -6.849*** 0.2346 
  Virtual Codeshare -0.8867*** 0.0127  -0.7232*** 0.0923 
 -1.122*** 0.1344 
  Percent Traditional for Airline a 0.1325*** 0.0144  9.0277*** 0.3084  12.35*** 0.4624 
  Percent Virtual for Airline a -0.1147*** 0.0115  -1.0889*** 0.1683  -0.643*** 0.2426 
  Spring  0.1111*** 0.0045  0.1570*** 0.0067 
 0.413*** 0.0137 
  Summer 0.0826*** 0.0045  0. 1244*** 0.0066 
 0.327*** 0.0129 
  Fall 0.0638*** 0.0045  0.0829*** 0.0066 
 0.222*** 0.0106 
  Constant -3.0333*** 0.0219  -2.0197*** 0.0376  -4.164*** 0.1135 
  Ticketing carrier fixed effects YES  YES 
 YES 
  Year fixed effects YES  YES 
 YES 
  Market Origin fixed effects YES  YES 
 YES 
  Market Destination fixed effects YES  YES 
 YES 
    
   
Taste variation (𝜙𝑣)         
  Constant - -  - - 
 3.225*** 0.0844 
  Price (in thousand $) - -  - - 
 0.346 9.847 
  Interstops - -  - - 
 0.099 0.2096 
    
   
R-squared 0.4417  - 
   
Value of GMM objective function -  - 
 51365.004 
Test of endogeneity  
   
     Ho: variables are exogenous  
   
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test:   3
2
  = 5293.29***            Prob_Value = 0.0000    
Robust regression F-test: F(3, 434184) = 1818.82***     Prob_Value = 0.0000    
     
  *** indicates statistical significance at 1%.  a variable is measured in values between zero and one when variable is used in demand estimation.  
For the Standard Logit Model, the well-known linear equation used for estimating the parameters is: 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑗) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆0) = 𝑥𝑗𝜙
𝑥 + 𝜙𝑝𝑝𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗, 
where 𝑆𝑗 =
𝑞𝑗
𝑃𝑂𝑃⁄  is the observed share of product j,  𝑆0 = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1  is the observed share of the outside good, and 𝜉𝑗 is the error term of 
the equation. 
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The following discussion of demand regression results in Table 7 focuses on the 
less restrictive random coefficients logit model.  The upper panel of the table reports the 
mean marginal (dis)utilities for each product characteristic (𝜙𝑝 and 𝜙𝑥), while the lower 
panel of the table reports the parameter estimates that measure taste variation across 
consumers for respective product characteristics (𝜙𝑣) . 
As expected, the coefficient estimate on Fare is negative, implying that higher 
prices are associated with lower levels of utility, ceteris paribus.  In other words, all else 
equal, passengers prefer cheaper air travel products.  
The coefficient estimate on Opres_out is positive.  This result is consistent with our 
priors, and suggests that travelers prefer to fly with airlines, all else equal, that offer 
services to more destinations from the travelers’ origin city.  This estimated effect is 
possibly in part due to the benefits of frequent-flyer programs.  Travelers are more likely 
to hold frequent-flyer membership with the airline they believe they are most likely to use 
in the future, and it is reasonable for a passenger to conjecture that they will most often use 
the airline that offers service to a relatively large number of destinations from the 
passenger’s origin city.  Once the passenger becomes invested in the airline’s frequent-
flyer program, this helps reinforce the passenger’s loyalty to the airline. 
The coefficient estimate on Interstops is negative, implying that consumers most 
prefer nonstop flights between their origin and destination compared to travel itineraries 
that require intermediate stops.  This is reasonable since passengers should prefer the most 
convenient travel itinerary from origin to destination. In addition, the coefficient estimate 
on Inconvenience is negative.  This intuitively makes sense as well since, for any given 
number of intermediate stops, passengers prefer the most direct routing to the destination.   
The coefficient estimate on Interstops divided by the coefficient estimate on the 
airfare variable, multiplied by 1000, is 78.19, which suggests that, on average, consumers 
are willing to pay up to $78.19 per intermediate stop to avoid air travel products with 
intermediate stops.  For example, if the price of an air travel product that requires one 
intermediate stop between an origin and destination is $200, then the coefficient estimates 
suggest that a typical consumer is willing to purchase a nonstop product in this market at a 
price of $278 or lower, ceteris paribus.       
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The Traditional Codeshare dummy variable has a negative coefficient estimate, 
implying that a traditional codeshare product makes passengers’ utility lower relative to a 
pure online product.  A likely reason is that the flight itinerary for a pure online product is 
typically very streamlined because an airline can better organize its own flights and 
schedules to minimize layover time, as well as efficiently organize its own gates at airports.  
Even though codeshare partners try to streamline flights across carriers to minimize layover 
times and facilitate smoother connections, the negative coefficient estimate on the 
Traditional Codeshare variable suggests that this process has not achieved parity with pure 
online products [Gayle (2013)].  The ratio of the coefficient estimates on the Traditional 
Codeshare and air fare variables suggest that a typical consumer is willing to pay up to 
$358.26 (=
6.85
19.12
× 1000) extra to obtain a pure online product compared to an otherwise 
equivalent traditional codeshare product, ceteris paribus.     
The Virtual Codeshare dummy variable has a negative coefficient estimate as well.  
This result suggests that passengers perceive virtual codeshare products as inferior 
substitutes to pure online products.  For the itineraries that include virtual segments, first-
class upgrades using accumulated frequent-flyer miles are not usually available [Ito and 
Lee (2007)].  This could explain why passengers perceive virtual codeshare products as 
inferior to pure online products.  The ratio of the coefficient estimates on the Virtual 
Codeshare and air fare variables suggest that a typical consumer is willing to pay up to 
$58.58 (=
1.12
19.12
× 1000) extra to obtain a pure online product compared to an otherwise 
equivalent virtual codeshare product, ceteris paribus.   
So while both types of codeshare products are inferior to pure online products, the 
evidence suggests that consumers perceive virtual codeshare products as less inferior than 
traditional codeshare products.  This consumer preference comparison across the two types 
of codeshare products make sense since virtual codeshare products do not require a 
passenger to switch operating airlines on the flight schedule, while traditional codeshare 
products do.      
Note that the coefficient estimate on Percent Traditional for Airline is positive, 
suggesting that consumers tend to choose the airlines that offer more traditional codeshare 
products in a market.  This result is consistent with the argument that airline codesharing 
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has a demand-increasing effect [Gayle and Brown (2012)].  A rationale for the demand-
increasing effect is due to the fact that codeshare partners typically make their frequent-
flyer programs reciprocal, thus allowing travelers holding frequent-flyer membership with 
one partner carrier to accumulate frequent-flyer points when flying with any partner carrier 
in the alliance.  Thus the new opportunities for travelers to accumulate frequent-flyer points 
across partner carriers can increase demand for the codeshare partners' products.  This 
result does not contradict with the previously discussed result suggesting that traditional 
codeshare products are less preferred by consumers compared to pure online products.  The 
reason is that the coefficient estimate on the Percent Traditional for Airline does not capture 
a consumer preference comparison between traditional codeshare products and pure online 
products, instead the coefficient estimate capture the impact of an airline providing more 
traditional codeshare products compared to competing airlines. 
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on Percent Virtual for Airline is negative, 
suggesting that, unlike traditional codesharing, virtual codesharing does not have a 
demand-increasing effect.  The evidence therefore suggests that airlines use these two types 
of codesharing practices to achieve different objectives.  To the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is the first to provide rigorous formal evidence suggesting that traditional 
codesharing has a demand-increasing effect, but virtual codesharing does not. 
The demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity estimate of -3.07.  As pointed 
out by Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986) and Brander and Zhang (1990), a reasonable range 
for own-price elasticity in the airline industry is from -1.2 to -2.0.  Peters (2006) study of 
the airline industry yields own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -3.2 to -3.6.  Berry 
and Jia (2010) find own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10 in their year 
2006 sample, while Gayle and Wu (2015) find own-price elasticity estimates ranging from 
-1.65 to -2.39 in their year 2010 sample.  Therefore, we are satisfied that the elasticity 
estimates generated from our model are reasonable and consistent with evidence in the 
existing literature.  
 As revealed by equation (8), the demand parameter estimates in Table 7 can be 
combined with the short-run supply-side Nash equilibrium price-setting assumption to 
compute product markups.  Overall, mean price is $166.35, while computed mean product 
markup is $60.18.  Since price minus markup yields marginal cost, then mean product 
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marginal cost is $106.17.  Therefore, the demand estimates combined with the short-run 
supply-side Nash equilibrium price-setting assumption suggest that marginal cost is, on 
average, approximately 64% ( ≈
$106.17
$166.35
× 100) of product price.   
Financial data reported by airlines are usually categorized by accounting concepts 
rather than economic concepts.  For example, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
compiles financial data from US airlines in the "Form 41 Financial Schedule" database, 
and this database reports various accounting decompositions of operating expenses and 
operating revenues.  However, nowhere in the airline database will you see data on 
economically relevant concepts such as marginal cost.  In other words, financial data 
reported by airlines are typically not in a format that is directly comparable to the type of 
economically relevant estimates generated by the econometric model.  Nevertheless, it is 
still worthwhile an attempt to piece together certain reported financial data, and use them 
to roughly validate some estimates from the econometric model. 
A financial variable reported by airlines in the operating revenues section of the 
"Form 41 Financial Schedule" is "Transport-Related Revenues".  Another useful financial 
variable reported by airlines in the operating expenses section of the database is "Flying 
Operations Expenses", which according to definitions by the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, these are "expenses incurred directly in the in-flight operation of aircraft and expenses 
related to the holding of aircraft and aircraft operational personnel in readiness for assignment 
for an in-flight status."  It is reasonable to presume that number of in-flight passengers 
positively correlates with size of aircraft and cost of in-flight operations.  Therefore, we 
believe that the reported "Flying Operations Expenses" is correlated with the number of in-
flight passengers that need to be served, and therefore is related to in-flight variable 
expenses of an airline.  As such, an airline's "Flying Operations Expenses" as a percentage 
of its "Transport-Related Revenues" should reasonably approximate what marginal cost as 
a percentage of price ought to be.  Interestingly, for the set of airlines in our data sample, 
these reported financial data reveal that "Flying Operations Expenses", on average, is 
approximately 51% of "Transport-Related Revenues".19  Therefore, it is reassuring that our 
                                                             
19 These financial data are drawn for the four quarters of 2007 from the "Air Carrier Financial: Schedule P-
1.2"  file located in the Air Carrier Financial Reports (Form 41 Financial Data) database.  This database is 
published and maintained by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 
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model estimates suggest that marginal cost is approximately 64% of product price.  
Furthermore, the supply equation in (8) suggests that if the marginal costs generated by the 
model are reasonable, then the product markups generated by the model should also be 
reasonable.     
 We also use the demand estimates along with equations (8) and (9) to compute 
quarterly market-level variable profits by airline.  Equation (9) illustrates that variable 
profit is computed as product markup multiplied by product quantity sold.  As we stated 
previously in the data section of the paper, the original database, before any cleaning, is 
only a 10% random sample of air travel tickets sold.  Therefore, even though our model 
seems to produce reasonable levels of product markups, due to the data only capturing at 
most 10% of the actual number of travel tickets sold, then the magnitudes of our variable 
profit estimates are at most roughly 10% of actual variable profits.  Variable profits are 
measured in constant year 1999 dollars.  Overall, an airline's mean quarterly variable profit 
in a directional origin-destination market is $53,984.43, while the median is $17,270.3.   
 
4.3 Estimation of Dynamic Model 
The likelihood function for the dynamic model is given by, 
𝐿(𝜃, 𝛾, 𝜆) =
∏ ∏ ∏ 𝑃(𝒂𝑚𝑡|?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 , ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 , 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑, 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡, 𝜃)𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑|𝑍𝑚𝑡 , 𝛾)𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡|𝑍𝑚𝑡, 𝜆)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑀
𝑚=1    (23) 
 
where 𝒂𝑚𝑡 = (𝑎1𝑚𝑡, 𝑎2𝑚𝑡, … , 𝑎𝑁𝑚𝑡) is the vector of market participation actions taken by 
airlines in period t.  Note that the likelihood function is comprised of three parts.  The first 
part, 𝑃(𝒂𝑚𝑡|?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 , ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 , 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑, 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡, 𝜃) computes the conditional likelihood of observing 
the logit choice probabilities of airlines being active in markets across the sample during 
the time span of the data.  To obtain the full unconditional likelihood, we multiply the 
conditional likelihood by the probabilities of observing specific values of  𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡, 
where 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 − 𝑍𝑚𝑡𝛾  and  𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 − 𝑍𝑚𝑡𝜆  
based on equations (15) and (16).  Since we assume that 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡  are normally 
distributed random variables with zero means and standard deviations 𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 and 𝜎𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡 
respectively, then 𝑓(∙) is the normal probability density function. 
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 While joint estimation of the full set of parameters (𝜃, 𝛾, 𝜆) is desirable due to 
potential efficiency gains, such joint estimation is extremely computationally demanding 
in this dynamic model.  Fortunately, a convenient feature of the likelihood function above 
is that each of the three vectors of parameters in (𝜃, 𝛾, 𝜆) is identified by separate parts of 
the likelihood function.  Specifically, 𝑃(𝒂𝑚𝑡|?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 , ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 , 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑, 𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡, 𝜃)  is the part that 
identifies parameters in vector 𝜃, while  𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑|𝑍𝑚𝑡 , 𝛾) and 𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡|𝑍𝑚𝑡, 𝜆) are the parts 
that identify parameter vectors 𝛾 and 𝜆 respectively.  This implies that parameter vectors 
𝛾  and 𝜆  can be separately estimated in a first step using likelihood functions 
∏ ∏ 𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑|𝑍𝑚𝑡, 𝛾)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑀
𝑚=1  and ∏ ∏ 𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡|𝑍𝑚𝑡, 𝜆)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑀
𝑚=1  respectively.  Given 
estimates 𝛾 and ?̂?, we can compute 𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑|𝑍𝑚𝑡 , 𝛾) and 𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡|𝑍𝑚𝑡, ?̂?) and use them to 
construct the relevant parts of 𝐿(𝜃, 𝛾, ?̂?) in order to estimate 𝜃 in a second step.  
Based on the discussion above, we use the following pseudo log likelihood function 
to estimate parameters in vector 𝜃: 
 
𝑄(𝜃, 𝑷, 𝛾, ?̂?) = ∑ ∑ ∑{𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑙𝑛[𝜓(𝑍𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 × 𝜃 + ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 )]
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ (1 − 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑙𝑛[𝜓(−?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 × 𝜃 − ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃 )]
+ 𝑙𝑛[𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑|𝑍𝑚𝑡, 𝛾)] + 𝑙𝑛[𝑓(𝜖𝑚𝑡
𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡|𝑍𝑚𝑡, ?̂?)]} 
(24) 
where 𝑄(𝜃, 𝑷, 𝛾, ?̂?) is called a “pseudo” log likelihood function because airlines’ 
conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) in 𝜓(∙)  are arbitrary and do not represent the 
equilibrium probabilities associated with 𝜃, where 𝜃 is the vector of parameters in the fixed 
and entry cost functions previously specified in equations (13) and (14).  Since the focus 
now is describing how 𝜃 is estimated, in what follows we drop 𝛾 and ?̂? when discussing 
“pseudo” log likelihood function 𝑄(∙) only for notational convenience.       
 We begin by implementing the Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML) estimation 
procedure [Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012)].  The PML requires two steps.  In step 1, we 
estimate relevant state transition equations.  Appendix A describes transition rules used for 
state variables.  In addition, nonparametric estimates of the choice probabilities 𝑃0̂ are 
computed in step1.  These nonparametric probability estimates, along with state variables 
and estimated state transition probabilities, are used to compute ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃0̂  and ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃0̂  as described 
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in Appendix B.  Using ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃0̂  and ?̃?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃0̂ , we are able to construct the pseudo log likelihood 
function, 𝑄(𝜃, 𝑃0̂).  In step 2 of the PML estimation algorithm, the vector of parameters 
𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿 is estimated by: 
 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝜃
𝑄(𝜃, 𝑃0̂) (25) 
This PML algorithm is simple and does not require solving for an equilibrium in 
the dynamic game, and thus substantially reduces computational burden.  However, the 
two-step pseudo maximum likelihood estimator 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿 can have a large finite sample bias 
[Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)].  To achieve consistency of the parameter estimates, we 
follow Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) and use as a starting point the PML parameter 
estimates along with the non-parametric estimates of the choice probabilities to implement 
the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) estimation algorithm.  To assess robustness of 
parameter convergence in our application of the NPL estimation algorithm, we have tried 
starting the algorithm at several distinct initial sets of  𝜃 and find that the NPL algorithm 
converged to qualitatively similar 𝜃 on each run of the estimation algorithm.  In subsequent 
discussion of parameter estimates from the dynamic model, we piece together certain 
official financial data reported by airlines, and use these data where possible to roughly 
validate some estimates from the dynamic model.  We describe the NPL estimation 
algorithm in Appendix C.20  
 
Results from first-stage estimation of parameter vectors 𝜸 and 𝝀 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for first-stage estimation of parameter vectors 
𝛾  and 𝜆 .  The results suggest that more concentrated airline presence at the market 
endpoints (measured by variable Lag HHI of Presence), and longer distance between 
market endpoints (measured by variable Nonstop Flight Distance) seem to incentivize 
relatively higher levels of traditional codesharing, but lower levels of virtual codesharing.  
At a minimum we can infer from these results that airlines' choice of the most prevalent 
                                                             
20 While the demand model is estimated using all three years in the data set (2005, 2006 and 2007), due to 
significant computational burden, we find that the dynamic entry/exit model can only feasibly be estimated 
using, at most, four quarters of the data.  We only use data in year 2005 when estimating the dynamic 
entry/exit model.  Even with just four quarters of data, the computer code for the dynamic entry/exit model 
took more than seven days of continuous running before convergence is achieved. 
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type of codesharing to employ in a market depends in part on certain market characteristics.   
Last, results of F-tests shown in the table suggest that all regressors as a group do explain 
variations in 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡.  
 
 
Table 8 
Estimation of Linear Equations  
for Percent Codeshare Variables 
  
Dependent Variable: 
Percent_Traditional 
Dependent Variable: 
Percent_Virtual 
Variables 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
(𝛾) 
Standard 
Error 
 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
(𝜆) 
Standard 
Error 
 
POP -2.84E-08 2.32E-07 1.37E-07 2.35E-07 
Nonstop flight distance 0.0016*** 7.68E-05 -0.0012*** 7.79E-05 
Lag HHI of Presence 0.9831** 0.4001 -3.6714*** 0.4056 
Constant -1.5868*** 0.4384 2.6997*** 0.4444 
Origin fixed effects YES YES 
Destination fixed effects YES YES 
Quarter fixed effects YES YES 
R-squared 0.2421 0.2943 
F-test 29.60     Prob>F = 0.000 38.63   Prob>F = 0.000 
              *** indicates statistical significance at 1% 
              **   indicates statistical significance at 5% 
Equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. 
 
 
4.4 Results from the dynamic model 
Table 9 reports estimates of parameters in the fixed and entry cost functions from 
the dynamic model.  The quarterly discount factor, β, is fixed at 0.99 (that implies an annual 
discount factor of 0.96).  All the estimated fixed and entry cost parameters are measured in 
ten thousands of annual 1999 dollars.  Due to previously discussed properties of our data 
sample, the reader is reminded that the magnitudes of our computed variable profits that 
feed into the dynamic model are at most roughly 10% of actual magnitudes, which in turn 
implies that the magnitudes of our fixed and entry cost estimates are at most 10% of actual 
magnitudes. 
Point estimates of parameters in the fixed cost functions are unreasonably small 
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and imprecisely estimated.  As such, we cannot draw reliable inferences about the size of 
fixed cost.  Fortunately, based on the objectives of our study we are most interested in 
parameter estimates in the entry cost function, which is where we now focus the remainder 
of the discussion.  
 
 
Table 9 
Estimates of Parameters in Fixed and Entry Cost Functions 
Variables 
Parameter Estimates 
(θ)  
(In ten thousand $) 
Standard 
Errorsa 
Fixed cost (quarterly):   
    Mean fixed cost 5.00E-10 0.0145 
    Size of Presence at market endpoints 7.06E-11 1.01E-04 
   
Entry costs:   
   Mean entry cost for Legacy carriers 3.0755*** 0.0153 
   Mean entry cost for Southwest 3.3499*** 0.0164 
   Mean entry cost for Other LCCs 2.7467*** 0.0135 
   Size of Presence at market endpoints -0.0072*** 9.85E-05 
   Traditional Codesharing  -0.0197*** 8.67E-04 
   Virtual Codesharing  -0.0042*** 5.42E-04 
   Traditional Codesharing × Southwest 0.0295*** 0.0011 
   Virtual Codesharing × Southwest 0.0069*** 0.0016 
   Traditional Codesharing × Other LCCs 0.0090*** 7.18E-04 
   Virtual Codesharing × Other LCCs -0.0058*** 6.53E-04 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% 
a Standard errors are computed via bootstrapping. The bootstrapping procedure is  
described in Appendix D.   
 
 
It is difficult to obtain data separate from those used in this study to validate market 
entry cost estimates generated by the model.  One reason for this difficulty is that the cost 
an airline faces to enter a market may in part be in terms of opportunity cost, i.e., the 
revenue forgone by not being able to use aircrafts in an alternate market.  With this caveat 
in mind, we now discuss parameter estimates in the entry cost function.               
Since the median variable profit is $17,270.3, then for a given directional origin-
destination market an airline generates, on average, less than $17,270.3 profit each quarter.  
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Estimates from Table 9 show that the average estimated cost to enter an origin-destination 
market is approximately $30,574, which is at least 1.77 times (=$30,574/$17,270.30) as 
large as quarterly profit.  It is notable from the estimates that mean entry cost differs by the 
carrier categories considered.  Southwest has the highest mean market entry cost followed 
by legacy carriers and other low-cost-carriers, $33,499, $30,755 and $27,467 respectively.  
Furthermore, the pairwise difference between any two of these three mean market entry 
costs is statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance.  The 
decision of market entry is forward-looking, and our estimates suggest that it will take an 
airline slightly more than one quarter of profits to recoup the one-time sunk entry cost 
investment. 
The estimated entry cost coefficient on “Size of Presence at market endpoints” is 
negative and statistically significant at conventional levels of statistical significance, 
suggesting that an airline’s market entry cost decreases with the size of the airline’s 
presence at the endpoint cities of the market.  In other words, larger endpoint city presence 
makes it easier for the airline to actually start servicing the route.  This result is consistent 
with how the literature believes airline markets work [see Berry (1992); Goolsbee and 
Syverson (2008); Gayle and Wu (2013) among others]. 
The coefficient estimates on traditional and virtual codesharing variables are 
negative and statistically significant.  Based on our previous discussion of the interpretation 
of parameters in the entry cost function (equation (14)), the coefficient estimates on these 
two codeshare variables essentially capture the influence of codesharing on the market 
entry cost of potential entrants that are legacy carriers.  Therefore, these coefficient 
estimates suggest that an increase in the extent of codesharing by incumbent carriers in a 
market reduces the market entry cost of potential entrants that are legacy carriers. 
Recall that our descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that: (1) the vast majority of 
codeshare products are provided by legacy carriers; and (2) almost all of each legacy 
carrier’s codeshare products are codeshared with other legacy carriers.  Therefore, the 
econometric evidence in Table 9 suggesting that more codesharing in a market makes it 
less costly for potential entrant legacy carriers to enter the market may in part be driven by 
the Chen and Ross (2000) argument, which is that incumbents may offer to share their 
facility (in our context, predominantly airplane seats owned by legacy carriers) with some 
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potential entrants (apparently other legacy carriers) in order to discourage the potential 
entrant from entering on a larger, and more competitive, scale by exclusively using its own 
plane on the full route.  In other words, entry may be encouraged, as reflected by the lower 
entry cost, in a way that limits the scale of entry. 
A key result is that the coefficient estimates on the two interaction variables 
between codesharing and the Southwest dummy variable are both positive and statistically 
significant.  In addition, the total effect (rather than the relative effect) of each type of 
codesharing on Southwest’s market entry cost is positive.  As previously discussed, the 
total effect of each type of codesharing is captured by the sum of the coefficients on the 
relevant codeshare variable and its interaction with the Southwest dummy variable.  As 
such, the total effect of traditional codesharing on Southwest’s market entry cost is 0.0098 
(= 0.0295 – 0.0197), while the total effect of virtual codesharing on Southwest’s market 
entry cost is 0.0027 (= 0.0069 – 0.0042).  So, even though each type of incumbent 
codesharing has a positive effect on Southwest’s market entry cost, the parameter estimates 
provide evidence that traditional codesharing has a larger impact on Southwest’s market 
entry cost compared to virtual codesharing.  In contrast, the total effect of each type of 
codesharing on other LCC’s market entry cost is negative.  The total effect of traditional 
codesharing on other LCC’s market entry cost is -0.0107 (= 0.0090 – 0.0197), while the 
total effect of virtual codesharing on other LCC’s market entry cost is -0.01 (= -0.0058 – 
0.0042).  In summary, the coefficient estimates suggest that incumbent codesharing raises 
the market entry cost for Southwest, but reduces market entry cost for all other carriers 
(legacy and other LCC).  In other words, market incumbent codesharing puts Southwest at 
a relative disadvantage to enter the market compared to potential entrants. 
 A useful feature of the structural econometric model is that the model allows us to 
monetize the extent to which codesharing by market incumbent carriers influences market 
entry barriers faced by potential entrants.  Parameter estimates in the entry cost function 
suggest that each percentage point increase in traditional codeshare products offered by 
incumbents in a market raises market entry cost for Southwest by 0.3%   (=
$295−$197
$33,499
×
100 ), while each percentage point increase in virtual codeshare products raises market 
entry cost for Southwest by 0.08% (=
$69−$42
$33,499
× 100).  In contrast, each percentage point 
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increase in traditional codeshare products offered by incumbents in a market reduces 
market entry cost by 0.64% (=
$197
$30,755
× 100) for potential entrant legacy carriers, and by 
0.39% (=
$197−$90
$27,467
× 100 ) for potential entrants that are other LCCs.  Similarly each 
percentage point increase in virtual codeshare products in a market reduces market entry 
cost by 0.14% (=
$42
$30,755
× 100) for potential entrant legacy carriers, and by 0.36% (=
$42+$58
$27,467
× 100) for potential entrants that are other LCCs. 
We argue above that a possible reason why potential entrant legacy carriers find it 
less costly to enter markets with more codesharing is due to the fact that the incumbents 
that codeshare are typically legacy carriers, and legacy carriers typically codeshare with 
other legacy carriers.  However, what is the rationale for the econometric results suggesting 
that codesharing between legacy carriers make it more difficult for Southwest, but less 
difficult for other LCCs to enter a market?  Codesharing alliances between legacy carriers 
prompt consumer loyalty through the carriers’ reciprocal frequent-flyer programs and more 
available product options, which requires Southwest to exert more effort to secure its 
consumer base.  For other LCCs, perhaps a large set of consumers served by them does not 
have significant overlap with the set of consumers served by legacy carriers, and therefore 
the two carrier types only weakly compete with each other.  However, Southwest has a 
unique crossover strategic position in which it effectively competes with both legacy and 
other LCC carriers’ for their respective consumer bases.  As such, a relative entry-deterrent 
effect for Southwest translates into a relative ease of market entry for both legacy and other 
LCC carriers. 
 
Counterfactual Experiment 
Another useful feature of the structural econometric model is that we can use it to 
perform counterfactual experiments.  Details on the general technical procedure of how we 
use the dynamic entry model to perform counterfactual experiment are laid out in 
Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012, pp. 170 -171).  However, the simple intuitive idea of the 
counterfactual experiment is the following.  We first generate market entry probabilities 
from the model using the factual set of parameter estimates reported in Table 9.  These 
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market entry probabilities can be referred to as the factual market entry probabilities.  Next, 
we generate market entry probabilities from the model using a counterfactual set of 
parameters, which can be referred to as the counterfactual market entry probabilities.  Since 
the objective is to analyze the impact of market incumbent carrier's codesharing on the 
probability that Southwest enters the market, the distinction between the factual and 
counterfactual sets of parameters is that the coefficient estimates on all codeshare variables 
are set equal to 0 in the counterfactual set of parameters.  When the entry cost function 
parameter estimates associated with codesharing are counterfactually set to zero in the 
model, this effectively lowers (increases) the market entry cost for Southwest (other 
carriers).  A comparison between Southwest's factual market entry probabilities with its 
counterfactual market entry probabilities reveals the impact that codesharing has on the 
probability that Southwest enters various markets.       
The factual market entry probabilities for Southwest range from 0.02 to 0.089 for 
markets in which codesharing impacts Southwest's probability of entering.  Our model 
predicts that Southwest’s market entry probabilities increase by a mean 15.81% when the 
parameters that capture the entry deterrence impact of codesharing are counterfactually set 
to zero in the model.  If we focus on the subset of markets in which Southwest’s market 
entry probabilities range from 0.02 to 0.05, then its market entry probabilities are predicted 
to increase by a mean 17.15% when the parameters that capture the entry deterrence impact 
of codesharing are counterfactually set to zero in the model.  So the markets in which 
Southwest have lower entry probabilities tend to have larger predicted percent increases in 
its entry probabilities.  These mean percent increases in Southwest’s market entry 
probabilities are statistically significant at the 1% level.   
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the market entry-deterrent impact of 
codesharing over the sample range of market entry probabilities for Southwest.  
Specifically, the figure plots the relationship between Southwest’s market entry probability 
and the predicted percent change in Southwest’s market entry probability due to 
counterfactual removal of the entry-deterrent impact of incumbent codesharing.  First, it is 
evident from Figure 1 that counterfactual removal of the entry-deterrent impact of 
incumbent codesharing increases the probability that Southwest enters a market over the 
sample range of Southwest’s market entry probabilities.  However, the extent of the 
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percentage increase in Southwest’s market entry probability is not uniform across its 
market entry probabilities.  It is evident that the predicted percent increases in entry 
probabilities have a bimodal feature over our sample range of Southwest’s market entry 
probabilities.  In particular, the entry-deterrent impact of incumbent codesharing on 
Southwest’s market entry probabilities is distinctively larger at two different levels of its 
market entry probabilities; specifically, counterfactual removal of the entry-deterrent 
impact of incumbent codesharing yields an approximate 60% predicted increase at market 
entry probability levels 0.02 and 0.056 respectively. 
 
 
  
 
 
In summary, the empirical analysis suggests that codesharing between market 
incumbent airlines results in a relative increase in Southwest’s market entry cost and a 
decrease in the probability that Southwest will enter the relevant market, which can be 
interpreted as an entry deterring effect to Southwest.  Importantly, we also find that the 
entry deterrent impact of incumbent codesharing is not linear with respect to the 
likelihood/probability of Southwest’s market entry. 
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Figure 1:  Relationship between Southwest's Market Entry Probability and 
Predicted Percent Change in its Market Entry Probability due to Counterfactual 
Removal of Entry-Deterent Impact of  Codesharing by Market Incumbents
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The main objective of our paper is to use a structural econometric model to 
investigate: (1) whether codesharing between airlines in domestic air travel markets, a form 
of strategic alliance, has a deterrent effect on the entry of potential competitors; (2) whether 
there is a particular type of codesharing among alliance partners that is most effective at 
deterring entry; and (3) whether the market entry deterrence impact of codesharing varies 
by the identity of potential market entrants.  Advantages of using a structural econometric 
model are that: (1) we are able to quantify, in monetary terms, possible market entry 
barriers associated with codesharing; and (2) we are able to predict the extent to which a 
potential entrant’s market entry probabilities are affected by market incumbent carrier’s 
codesharing. 
We find that more codesharing, both traditional and virtual, between incumbent 
carriers in a market puts Southwest at a relative disadvantage to enter the market compared 
to all other potential entrants (legacy carriers and other low-cost carriers).  Specifically, 
each percentage point increase in traditional codeshare products offered by incumbents in 
a market raises market entry cost for Southwest by 0.3%, but reduces market entry cost by 
0.64% and 0.39% for legacy and “other” low-cost carriers respectively.  However, each 
percentage point increase in virtual codeshare products offered by incumbents in a market 
raises market entry cost for Southwest by 0.08%, but reduces market entry cost by 0.14% 
and 0.36% for legacy and “other” low-cost carriers respectively.  In addition, the model 
predicts that Southwest’s market entry probabilities increase by a mean 15.81% when the 
parameters that capture the entry deterrence impact of codesharing are counterfactually set 
to zero in the model.  Therefore, codesharing by market incumbent carriers has a relative 
market entry deterrent effect on Southwest.  Furthermore, the parameter estimates provide 
evidence that traditional codesharing has a larger impact on Southwest’s market entry cost 
compared to virtual codesharing. 
We argue that the entry deterrent effect is binding for Southwest but not for others 
due to the evidence that the vast majority of codesharing is done between legacy carriers, 
and competition between Southwest and legacy carriers is stronger than competition 
between other low-cost carriers and legacy carriers.  Consistent with this argument, 
previous work provides evidence that incumbent legacy carriers do not cut fares in response 
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to potential competition from other low-cost carriers, but cut fares in response to potential 
competition from Southwest [Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2012)]. 
We also find that an airline’s market entry cost decreases with the size of the 
airline’s presence at the endpoint cities of the market.  This finding is consistent with 
findings in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), and may be due to economies of scale and scope 
by concentrating most operations in a hub airport. 
The focus of our study is on U.S. domestic air travel markets, however future work 
may investigate whether results similar to ours exist for codesharing in international air 
travel markets.   
 
Appendix A: Transition Rules for State Variables 
 
The state variables we observe are: 
{𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡} . We utilize Vector 
autoregressions (VAR) to model transition rules for the state variables 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗  , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 , 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 , and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡.  
Let 𝑍𝑚𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟 =
 {1, 𝑅1𝑚𝑡
∗ , … , 𝑅9𝑚𝑡
∗ ,    𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠1𝑚𝑡, … , 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠9𝑚𝑡, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡}.  
 
Transition rules for the state variables are as follows: 
 
   𝑠𝑖𝑚,𝑡+1 = 𝑎𝑖𝑡       (A1) 
 
   𝑅𝑖𝑚,𝑡+1
∗ = 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝛼
𝑅𝑍𝑚𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 𝜁𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑅 )     (A2) 
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚,𝑡+1 = 𝛼
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑍𝑚𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 𝜁𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠      (A3) 
  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚,𝑡+1 = 𝛼
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑍𝑚𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟  + 𝜁𝑚𝑡
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑    (A4) 
 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚,𝑡+1 = 𝛼
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑍𝑚𝑡
𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 𝜁𝑚𝑡
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙      (A5) 
 
where 𝜁𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑅 , 𝜁𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 ,  𝜁𝑚𝑡
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 , and 𝜁𝑚𝑡
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  are assumed to be normally 
distributed.  
The joint transition probabilities of the state variables are determined by: 
 
𝐹𝑖
𝜎(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑎𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑡) =
{
1{𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 = 1} ∗ Pr𝑅 ∗ Pr𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ Pr𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ∗ Pr𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 ∗ Pr𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 
1{𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0} ∗ Pr𝑅
′ ∗ Pr𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠 ∗ Pr𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 ∗ Pr𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 ∗ Pr𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝
  (A6) 
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where 
 
Pr𝑅 = 𝐹𝑅(𝑅𝑖𝑡+1|𝑅𝑖𝑡) ∗ ∏ 𝐹𝑅(𝑅𝑗𝑡+1|𝑅𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖       (A7) 
 
Pr𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝐹𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡+1|𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) ∗ ∏ 𝐹𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡+1|𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖    (A8) 
 
Pr𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑 = 𝐹𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑡+1|𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑡)  (A9) 
 
Pr𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝐹𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡+1|𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑡) (A10) 
 
Pr𝑅
′ = 1{𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0} ∗ ∏ 𝐹𝑅(𝑅𝑗𝑡+1|𝑅𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖       (A11) 
 
Pr𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝜎𝑗(𝑦𝑗𝑡, 𝜀𝑗𝑡)|𝑦𝑗𝑡)𝑗≠𝑖       (A12) 
 
 
Appendix B: Representation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) 
using Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs) 
 
Recall that expected one-period profit function, 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑡), is specified as: 
 
 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝑎𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ − 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡(𝐹𝐶𝑖 + (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝐸𝐶𝑖),  (B1) 
where parametric specifications for 𝐹𝐶𝑖 and 𝐸𝐶𝑖 were previously given in equations (13) 
and (14).  Based on equation (B1): 
 
 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(0, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗  (B2) 
and 
 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(1, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ − 𝐹𝐶𝑖 − (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝐸𝐶𝑖 (B3) 
Let 
 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝑡(0, 𝑦𝑡) = {𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ , 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0} (B4) 
and 
 
𝑧𝑖𝑚𝑡(1, 𝑦𝑡)    
=   {𝑅𝑖𝑚𝑡
∗ , −1, −𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡,
−1,   − (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 ,             
− (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡   ,    
−(1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 ,
−(1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 × 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡,
−(1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 × 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡,   
− (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑡 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑐𝑐,    
−(1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑉𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑡 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑐𝑐 } 
(B5) 
and 
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 𝜃 = {1, 𝜃0
𝐹𝐶 , 𝜃1
𝐹𝐶 , 𝜃0
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃1
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃2
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃3
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃4
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃5
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃6
𝐸𝐶 , 𝜃7
𝐸𝐶} (B6) 
Therefore, we can re-write: 
 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(0, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝑡(0, 𝑦𝑡) × 𝜃 (B7) 
and 
 𝛱𝑖𝑚𝑡(1, 𝑦𝑡) = 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝑡(1, 𝑦𝑡) × 𝜃 (B8) 
As discussed in Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), the MPE can be represented as a 
vector of conditional choice probabilities (CCPs), P.  P = {Pi(y): for every firm and state 
(i, y)} that solves fixed point problem 𝑷 = 𝜓(𝑷, 𝜃) is a vector of best response mapping: 
 
{𝜓 (?̃?𝑖
𝑃(𝑦)
𝜃
𝜎𝜀
+ ?̃?𝑖
𝑃(𝑦)) : 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑖, 𝑦)} 
(B9) 
where in our study 𝜓(∙) is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution, and 
 
 
?̃?𝑖
𝑃(𝑦) = 𝑍𝑖(1, 𝑦) − 𝑍𝑖(0, 𝑦) + 𝛽[𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (1) − 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (0)] × 𝑤𝑧,𝑖
𝑃 , (B10) 
 
 
?̃?𝑖
𝑃(𝑦) = 𝛽[𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (1) − 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (0)] × 𝑤𝑒,𝑖
𝑃 , (B11) 
 
 
𝑤𝑧,𝑖
𝑃 = (1 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ )
−1 × {𝑃𝑖(𝑦) ∗ 𝑍𝑖(1, 𝑦) + [1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑦)] ∗ 𝑍𝑖(0, 𝑦)}, (B12) 
 
 
𝑤𝑒,𝑖
𝑃 = (1 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ )
−1 × [𝑃𝑖(𝑦) ∗ 𝑒𝑖
𝑃] (B13) 
 
and 
 
 
𝐹𝑖,𝑦𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ = [(𝑃𝑖(𝑦) × 1𝑀
′ ) ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (1) + ((1 − 𝑃𝑖(𝑦)) × 1𝑀
′ ) ∗ 𝐹𝑖,𝑦
𝑃 (0)]. (B14) 
 
where F𝑖𝑦
P (0) and F𝑖𝑦
P (1) are state transition probability matrices for 𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 0 and 𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 1 
respectively; 𝑤𝑧,𝑖
𝑃  and 𝑤𝑒,𝑖
𝑃  are vectors of valuations that depend on CCPs and transition 
probabilities, but not on the dynamic parameters being estimated. Since 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡 is assumed 
type 1 extreme value distributed, 𝑒𝑖
𝑃 is a function vector equal to 𝑒𝑖
𝑃 = 𝛾 − 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖(𝑦)) 
where γ = 0.5772 is Euler’s constant. 
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Appendix C: Implementing the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) 
Estimator 
 Nadaraya-Watson kernel nonparametric regression is used to get nonparametric 
estimate. Given the PML estimator, 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿, and the initial nonparametric estimate of CCPs, 
𝑃0̂, we construct a new estimator of CCPs, 𝑃1̂,using the best response CCPs equation 𝑃1̂ =
𝜓(𝑦, 𝑃0̂, 𝜃𝑃𝑀𝐿).  Then we redo the maximization of the pseudo likelihood function to obtain 
a new estimate of 𝜃 using 𝑃1̂, instead of  𝑃0̂, in the pseudo log likelihood function, that is, 
we solve 𝜃2 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝜃
𝑄(𝜃, 𝑃1̂).  The process is repeated K times, and the K
th estimates 
of 𝜃  and P are obtained by 𝜃𝐾 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max
𝜃
𝑄(𝜃, 𝑃𝐾−1̂)  and 𝑃?̂? = 𝜓(𝑦, 𝑃𝐾−1̂, 𝜃𝐾) 
respectively.  The algorithm is terminated on the Kth iteration only if the CCP vector 𝑃?̂? is 
“close” to 𝑃𝐾−1̂ based on a stipulated tolerance level.  Based on this algorithm, an NPL 
fixed point is defined as a pair (𝜃𝐾, 𝑃𝐾−1̂).  In our estimation, the algorithm is terminated 
when K=5. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) argue that this NPL estimation algorithm 
can reduce significantly the finite sample bias of the two-step PML estimator. 
 
Appendix D: Bootstrapping Standard Errors for Parameter Estimates in 
the Dynamic Entry Model 
First, we assume that parameter estimates from the first-stage regressions are 
normally distributed with means equal to the point estimates of the parameters, and their 
variances and covariances equal to the estimated variance-covariance matrix for these 
parameters.  This assumption allows us to generate normal random draws of the parameter 
estimates from the first-stage regressions.  The first-stage regressions are: (1) the demand 
model; and (2) the traditional codeshare, and virtual codeshare linear regressions (these are 
equations (15) and (16) in the paper).  Specifically, we generate 35 random draws from a 
multivariate normal distribution.  The multivariate normal distribution we use has means 
equal to the existing first-stage parameter estimates, and variance/covariance equal to the 
variance/covariance matrix of the first-stage parameter estimates.  A single draw from the 
multivariate normal distribution produces a set of first-stage parameter estimates.  As such, 
we effectively generate 35 sets of first-stage parameter estimates from this random draw 
process. 
For each draw of the first-stage parameter estimates, we re-estimate the dynamic 
entry model to obtain a set of dynamic parameter estimates associated with each of the 35 
sets of first-stage parameter estimates, respectively.  In other words, the dynamic entry 
model is re-estimated 35 times, where each estimation uses a different set of first-stage 
parameter estimates.  This procedure is extremely computationally intensive since a single 
estimation of the dynamic entry model can take several weeks of continuous computer 
running to achieve convergence of the estimation algorithm.  
Once we have 35 different sets of dynamic parameter estimates, we then use simple 
descriptive statistics to compute the standard errors across the 35 data points for each 
structural parameter estimate.  This produces a bootstrap standard error for each dynamic 
parameter estimate.    
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